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1. Introduction to the study of civil society and 
democratisation in Burundi 
Since the end of the Cold War there has been an increased emphasis on the concept 
civil society among researchers and a widespread assumption among many policy 
makers in different parts of the world about its global relevance in strengthening 
societal development and democracy (Lewis:2002:569). Even though the concept of 
civil society has been seen as central to contemporary discourses on democracy and 
democratisation, there exists considerable controversy over the conditions under 
which civil society is said to exist, its location and the constraints under which it 
operates (Pereira:2001:158). 
The contemporary revival of the “civil society” notion is generally related to the 
political liberalisation and democratisation in Latin America and Eastern Europe 
during the 1980’s and early 1990’s. In the 1990’s the debate on political liberalisation 
further spread from these regions into the continent of Africa (Sjøgren:2001:35). 
However as the idea of civil society is firmly rooted in liberal political thought, there 
exist significant doubts regarding the notion of civil society and thus its applicability 
to the political realities of African nations.  
Democratisation in Africa has to a large extent been absorbed by the Western neo-
liberal “good governance discourse” where the notion of civil society is seen as 
inherently democratic. This approach to civil society and democratisation is 
predominantly a-historical and de-contextualised from historical structures. Viewing 
civil society as having mainly a “consolidating” role is an unrealistic picture of what 
the existing civil society in Africa actually entails (Abrahamsen:2000:52-57).  
Across Africa, civil society takes on a different character from that of most Western 
liberal democracies. It reflects underlying social and economic conditions as well as 
the particular historical and political circumstances of individual countries. Prevailing 
ethnic and kinship structures, the legacy of colonialism, the pattern of economic 
development and authoritarian forms of political rule gives rise to a different form of 
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civil society than what can be said to be the case of most of the Western World 
(Wake:2004). Consequently, there is a possibility that civil society within the process 
of democratisation can be impeded by factors such as a dependence of external 
funding, ethnic divisions, state censorship and gender bias- all of which strongly 
characterise African politics. 
While Western scholars have emphasised the need to take local conditions into 
consideration, in reality there have been few attempts to actually do so. Peace 
negotiations and democratisation in countries raged by civil war in Africa have often 
been conducted on an elite level, excluding the civil society. What Samuel 
Huntington has termed the “third wave of democracy”, whereby several countries of 
the world shifted from authoritarian rule to democracy over the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, was often brought about by what has been referred to as ‘elite 
transition’(Bentley and Southall:2000:149).  
According to Comaroff (1999), there is a need to focus less on high levels of rhetoric 
abstraction and historical generalisations towards producing more close up 
observations of civil society. In close relation to this Mamdani (1996:19) argues the 
need for ‘an analysis of actually existing civil society so as to understand its actual 
formation rather than as a promised agenda for change’.  
In this specific context, Burundi is a particularly interesting case. Since Burundi 
gained independence from the Belgians in 1962 the country has been plagued by 
three periods of ethnic civil unrest. Burundi’s conflicts are rooted in the unequal 
distribution of wealth and power which has a strong ethnic and regional dimension. 
The country’s populations is made up of three ethnic groups- the Hutu, the Tutsi and 
the Twa- comprising of approximately 85 %, 14% and 1% of the population 
respectively (Krueger:2007:23)1 The crisis- to a large extent- has been exacerbated 
by the ongoing civil war facing the country since October 1993.  
                                              
1 As no population counts based on ethnicity has been done in the past half century, the percentage has most probably 
changed (Kruger:2007:24). 
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Postcolonial ethnic oligarchies have often provided a hostile terrain for democratic 
processes which are often said to have been the case in Burundi. It has been argued 
that inequalities along ethnic and regional lines which reflect the Burundian crisis 
lower the prospects of democratisation and reconciliation (Sandbrook:2000:66). 
Despite these odds, in 28 of August 2000 the political fractional parties of Burundi 
signed a peace agreement to end an era of violence. Following from this, in 2005 
Burundi had their first democratic election after 12 years of civil war and a power-
sharing government was subsequently established. With the nation under the 
governance of a democratically elected government for the past three years, we are 
now witnessing the longest period of democratic rule in the Burundi’s history. In this 
respect it is interesting to investigate the local civil society in Burundi. 
 Currently there does not appear to exist any substantial study of local civil society in 
Burundi and its role in the ongoing democratisation process. This thesis intends to fill 
parts of this knowledge gap. This thesis specifically aims to highlight out the civil 
society actors that exist in contemporary Burundi who are considered of high 
importance regarding the democratisation and development of civil society. In 
additional an investigation as to how these are able to engage in political and 
democratic processes will be undertaken.  
This thesis will deliberate on the possibilities and constrains of local civil society 
organisations (CSO’s) in the on going democratisation process. With this research 
focus in mind,  the material of the civil society in Burundi is primarily based on 
interviews of local civil society organisations in the capital of Bujumbura and the 
rural municipality of Butaganzwa north in Burundi. Due to 90 percent of the 
Burundian population living in rural areas, it is vital that rural municipalities are not 
excluded from civil society when analysing civil society as a whole (Tribune:2008). 
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1.1 Aim and Research question 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the civil society in Burundi from both an urban 
and a rural perspective. As previously mentioned, Burundi is currently experiencing 
an ongoing democratisation process. However, there currently exists no documented 
research related to if and how the local civil society might contribute in this process.  
Accordingly, the research question which will be addressed throughout this thesis is: 
What represents civil society organisations in Burundi and what role does civil 
society play in the process towards democratisation? 
This thesis chose to investigate the relationship between one independent variable 
and one dependent variable-the relationship between civil society (independent) and 
democratisation (dependent). There are many additional factors that also influence 
the democratisation process. Modernisation, industrialisation, and socio-economical 
factors, increased economic growth, are for instance factors that are seen as positive 
for a country undergoing a democratisation processes. Burundi is suffering from an 
economic crisis characterised by an extreme poverty. Rural poverty in particular has 
been noted to have increased by 80 % since 1993 (Bentley, Southall:2005:21-22). 
Today Burundi is ranked as the third poorest country in the world by the World Bank 
(WB:2008). Socio-economic conditions clearly set constraints to any democratisation 
process, as extreme poverty -which is the case in Burundi- hampers the overall 
societal development of a country. Nevertheless, the limited scope of this thesis does 
not allow me to discuss several of these factors. Consequently, I argue that it is better 
to undertake a comprehensive study of one specific aspect in depth that might 
influence the democratisation process rather than attempting to simultaneously 
analyse several factors which could lead to a very superficial analysis that is unable to 
provide significant further research to the already lacking field.  
At present, there exists little- if any- research related to civil society in Burundi and 
the role it can play in the democratisation process. Consequently this thesis will 
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provide new knowledge regarding the role of civil society in Burundi in the ongoing 
democratisation process. 
The civil society of Burundi will be analysed in the light of ethnicity, citizenship, 
political and financial autonomy. As these are considered to represents some of the 
more significant aspects to address within the specific context of the Burundian 
nation state. 
1.2 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. The following chapter-chapter 2- will 
discuss the overall research design used for the purpose of this thesis. Fieldwork and 
interviews of CSO’s in Burundi constitute an important part of this thesis and this 
chapter aims to assess the various methodological challenges related to this. Chapter 
3 introduces the thesis’s theoretical framework. This chapter discuss the problematic 
concept of civil society with regards to African political realities. In addition it aims 
to specify and delimit the important concepts of civil society and democratisation and 
how these will be used for the purpose of this thesis. Chapter 4 provides a 
background of the political scene within Burundi where the particular socio-political 
realities of Burundi is introduced. This chapter aims to deliberate on how the 
historical socio-political evolvement in Burundi from pre-colonial to post colonial 
time has shaped the society- and therefore also the civil society in Burundi. The 
dimension of ethnicity and citizenship and how the Burundians are politically tied to 
these identities are central aspects to this chapter. These dimensions will be further 
explored in the analysis of Bujumbura civil society in chapter 5. The first part of 
chapter 5 will present a typology of the CSO’s of enquiry. The objectives, methods of 
work and achievements of these CSO’s will be assessed. Chapter 6 emphasises the 
rural dimension of civil society in the specific context of the municipality of 
Butaganzwa. Chapter 7 highlights the main findings of the study and concluding 
remarks will be presented in chapter 8.  
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2. Methodology 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the overall quality of the method and research 
design used for the purpose of this thesis. This thesis will draw upon theoretical and 
empirical literature, but the main focus lies on the interviews conducted during my 
fieldwork in Burundi. Consequently, this chapter will mainly focus on the challenges 
related to this. 
2.1 Single Case Study and the choice of case 
The primary objective of this thesis has been to undertake a contextual analysis of the 
local civil society in Burundi in order to analyse the specific role it has the potential 
to play throughout the process of democratisation. 
Consequently, the type of research design this thesis has chosen to undertake is the 
use of case studies. The choice of using case studies serves as the most appropriate 
research design for this thesis due to the fact that the ability of other forms of research 
strategies to capture contextual conditions is limited (Yin:2003:13).  
Accordingly, the approach of my thesis will be structured as an explorative case 
study due to the fact that prior to this thesis no previous research in relation to local 
civil society and democratisation in the given context-the Burundi nation state-has yet 
been undertaken. 
 It is important to note here that while the route of an exploratory case study is the 
primary method of research design, it is not exclusively exploratory due to the fact 
that the key arguments of this thesis have built on various theoretical contributions 
within the existing literature on civil society and democratisation. This approach is 
similar to what Andersen refers to as “theory interpretive design” 
(Andersen:1997:68). The aim of such an approach to a case study is to utilize a 
theoretical framework in order to structure the revealed empirical material. Existing 
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theory within the areas of civil society, democracy and democratisation will form the 
principle theoretical framework which will be used for the purpose of my analysis.    
While this thesis focuses on the civil society process of the African nation state 
Burundi, it is important to bear in mind that drawing parallel conclusion to other 
countries in the African Great Lakes region will pose difficulties as one need to 
investigate CSO’s in its given context. This is because national history, culture and 
development are important aspects to consider when analysing civil society and the 
role it can play in a democratisation process. However, in spite of these difficulties 
the research of this thesis will demonstrate that there do exist particular historical and 
cultural similarities between several countries within the Great Lakes Region, 
particularly between Burundi and Rwanda.   
Further knowledge about the development of civil society actors in relation to the 
democratisation process in Burundi can therefore-at times-provide an increased 
understanding of certain dimensions considered important to civil society within 
further countries throughout this region of Africa.  
Gerring (2004) makes a distinction between formal and informal units. The formal 
unit is the unit chosen for intensive analysis of which one has in-depth knowledge. 
The informal unit refers to other units that are brought into the analysis in a less 
structured way often as a part of the introduction or the conclusion 
(Gerring:2004:343-344). Burundi forms the basis for this thesis’s formal unit of 
analysis while other countries in Africa, particularly those situated within the Great 
Lakes region, serve as informal units of analysis. 
There already exist extensive research contributions in the area of civil society and its 
contribution to democratisation. Why then is Burundi interesting to investigate in this 
respect?  
Firstly, there presently lacks any consensus in regard to the role civil society is 
expected to play in the strengthening of democracy- especially in an African context. 
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Furthermore, the notion of civil society and democracy in an African context is 
highly controversial. However, despite varying political view points there are now 
indications that CSO’s have the ability to positively contribute towards the 
democratisation process (Makumbe:1998). Within the context of Burundi there 
presently exists no documented research on Burundian civil society. A major civil 
milestone for the nation lies in the fact that Burundi has recently undergone its first 
democratic election. However, peace and security of the nation remains fragile.  
Consequently I believe it is of high importance to conduct an in depth study of the 
present day CSO’s operation throughout Burundi in order to assess whether CSO’s in 
Burundi can contribute towards enhanced democracy.  
If this is not the case, it is also important to view how political- historical aspects 
possibly obstruct the development of a viable civil society and the consequences this 
has for the democratisation process. This research aims to provide a contribution to 
the debate regarding civil society and democratisation in Africa.  
2.2 Sources and Fieldwork 
The thesis is based on the triangulation of sources, between primary and secondary 
sources which enhance the data’s reliability (Yin:2003:97). When selecting sources 
their relevance compared to the research question was emphasised. For the purpose of 
this thesis a collection of relevant data regarding the independent variable- civil 
society in Burundi and my dependent variable- democracy and democratisation was 
necessary in order to gain an understanding of the relationship between the two 
variables. 
Several types of sources have been used for the purpose of this thesis such as books, 
reports and news articles. However, the primary material for my analysis is based on 
semi-structured interviews conducted under my fieldwork in Bujumbura and 
Butaganzwa. Yin (2003:93) argues that ‘most of the best case studies are based on a 
variety of sources’. 
 19
Due to the lack of documented research regarding CSO’s in Burundi, the only 
sources of information related to the independent variable (civil society) has been 
based on primary sources from my interviews. Relevant books and research within 
the literature field have also been utilised in order to back up my arguments and 
findings. 
Throughout my fieldwork in Burundi twelve semi-structured qualitative interviews of 
a selected number of local CSO’s based in the capital of Bujumbura were conducted 
over a period of three weeks (January 21to February 10).2 In addition four days were 
spent in Butaganzwa, a rural community north in Burundi, where a workshop was 
held and attended by representatives from the majority of the existing 
“communitarian associations”3 within this municipality. As part of this workshop 
further observation, fieldwork and some informal interviews with representatives 
from local communitarian associations were undertaken. During every interview in 
Butaganzwa there was always a member of the administration present. I was not 
allowed to discuss their relationship to the local administration. From these 
observations it is probable that the communitarian associations withheld information 
they otherwise would have given me if the administration was not present.  
Most of the interviews in Bujumbura were conducted with one informant at the time, 
often with the director or members of staff who held positions of leadership within 
the organisation.  However, several interviews comprised of interviewing two or 
three informants at the time. The length of the interviews varied from one to three 
hours and in ten out of twelve interviews a tape recorded was utilised. Interviews 
with politicians, representatives from international NGO’s, general members of the 
community and two Danish missionaries living both in the capital and in the rural 
province were conducted. Most of the interviews were conducted in French with 
additional help from a language interpreter. In the even of language confusion and 
                                              
2  Appendix 1 
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when certain clarifications were needed. I purposely chose to have a Congolese 
interpreter with me at all times. Because certain questions asked were targeted at 
gaining a greater understanding of the sensitive ethnic roots of the conflict and ethnic 
divide that still exist between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi, employing a Hutu or a Tutsi 
interpreter had the potential to bias the information required. Therefore, employing a 
Congolese interpreter was vital in order to obtain information regarding the ethnic 
dimension. My interpreter was the one asking the ethnic related question as he was 
familiar with the “do’s” and “don’ts” regarding ethnicity. Most probably this gave me 
more information regarding these questions than what I would have obtained alone. 
Recognising that patron-client relationships exist in urban civil society, this was one 
of the aspects this thesis has intended to investigate. However, given the short time 
frame under which this fieldwork was undertaken it was unfeasible to obtain 
sufficient information to state something concrete regarding these networks. 
Consequently the dimension of patron-client relationship will not be discussed in 
detail regarding the local civil society in Bujumbura.  
Despite spending a shorter period of time in the rural municipality of Butaganzwa, 
patron-client networks were more visible in this area making it more viable to discuss 
the patron-client relationship in chapter 6- which concern the rural communitarian 
associations of Butaganzwa.  
Presently there is limited literature in regards to the socio-political situation of 
Burundi. As a consequence this has resulted in a number of challenges with regards 
to writing this thesis. My main sources on Burundi are therefore based on a few 
notable scholars of the region in general, Lemarchand (1994 and 1995), Chretien 
(1995), Reyntjens (1995) Uvin (1999), Herisse (2000) Bentley and Souhall (2005) 
and a recent contribution from Krueger (2007).  
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2.3 Validity and Reliability 
2.3.1 Construct validity  
Construct validity is especially problematic in relation to case study design. This is 
because investigators can engage in high levels of “subjectivity” in relation to the 
collection of data (Yin:2003:93). Subjectivity appeared to be particular problematic 
and challenging in relation to collecting the necessary data material regarding the 
independent variable-civil society in Burundi. As there presently exist no documented 
research within the literature of civil society within the specific context of Burundi, 
the selection of local CSO’s was not easily completed. Due to the lack of certainty to 
as whether there even exists a civil society in the given context, a lengthy and time 
consuming process was necessary to map out the necessary CSO’s on which to build 
the case study. However, the fact that four months prior to my fieldwork in Burundi 
were focused on establishing contact with experts in the field4, who could provide 
reliable information about the local CSO’s represented in the capital of Bujumbura,5 
strengthen the construct validity of my independent variable-civil society.  
The final choice of organisations is a selection of the most established CSO’s in 
Bujumbura. A further factor that strengthens the construct validity is the fact that a 
comprehensive understanding of the theoretical framework was obtained before the 
fieldwork was conducted. Thorough understanding of the literature was able to 
provide an indication of the type of data required for the research. The limited scope 
and time frame of this thesis, made it necessary to exclude certain important sources 
which may have reduced the construct validity of the arguments made in this study. 
                                              
4 I contacted representatives from the UN, UNIFEM, NRC, ACCORD, Danish missionaries, WB.  
5  Prior to making the final decision regarding the local CSO’s of enquiry I wrote 1000 emails to people in Burundi 
Bujumbura.  
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2.3.2 Internal Validity 
When explaining a phenomenon, it is often assumed that there exists a causal 
relationship. The internal validity is concerned with whether this correlation is valid. 
This thesis chooses not to use the term causal relationship rather, the terms causal 
mechanism will be employed (Gerring:2004:348). I intend to assess whether CSO’s 
in Burundi impact on the ongoing democratisation in Burundi. In order to ensure the 
validity of the causal mechanism outlined in this thesis, a set of rival explanations is 
necessary. If the rival explanations are found to be implausible, this strengthens the 
causal mechanisms set out for this thesis and thereby the internal validity. 
2.3.3 External validity 
One much debated question with regards to single case study design is concerned 
whether the findings and conclusions can be generalized beyond the single case of 
Burundi (Yin:2003:37). In other words, if it possible to draw any conclusions 
regarding civil society and democratisation in other countries in Africa -based on the 
findings in this particular study.  
The external validity of a single case study is weaker than in a case study existing of 
several cases. A focus on civil society and democratisation of several countries in the 
Great Lakes Region for instance would have strengthened the ability to prove one’s 
assertions. However, such a case study would have proven too comprehensive with 
regards to the timeframe of this thesis. Burundi is a country where the path towards 
democratisation is unstable. Therefore the aim of this thesis is to assess what role the 
civil society in Burundi can play in this respect. These aspects are viewed in the light 
of the specific Burundian context focusing on historical aspects which obviously 
have influenced the Burundian society and possibly the civil society. Focusing on the 
dimensions of ethnicity and political autonomy in order to view how these 
dimensions have affected the civil society and also the path towards democratisation. 
Even though the emphasis of this thesis is linked to the specific historical context of 
Burundi, Burundi is in certain ways similar to other countries in the region. They 
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have all been colonised, Burundi and Rwanda were previously part of the same 
country and is therefore comprised by the same “ethnic” groups of Hutu, Tutsi and 
Twa. While the aim is not to draw conclusion from my findings to other countries in 
the region, it is assumed that the findings of this thesis in relation to civil society and 
democratisation in Burundi can provide useful knowledge concerning civil society 
and democratisation in the neighbouring region.  
The theory used for the purpose of this thesis stems from an African context in 
general and not for Burundi explicitly. According to Yin (2003:37) use of theory 
from a more general basis strengthens the external validity..  
With regards to generalizations it is a question of whether cases, findings are 
representative for all of Burundi and whether the rural case of Butaganzwa is 
representative for other rural cases in Burundi. 
2.3.4 Reliability 
Reliability involves demonstrating that the operations of a study can be repeated with 
the same findings my another investigator (Yin:2003:34). In a qualitative case study 
it is essential to make sure that the methods that have been used are well documented. 
Yin (2003:105) refers to this as a “chain of evidence”. This is vital due to the fact that 
it is not possible with the use of qualitative method to measure the margin of error 
which is possible with the use of quantitative methods. The challenges of reliability 
encountered in the writing of this thesis displayed characteristics of Yin’s chain of 
evidence. In some cases the information of one informant only was utilised. 
However, in every case this thesis has endeavoured to verify the reliability of the 
information with other informants. With no documented research within the field, 
there was no other way to verify the reliability of my sources. Another challenge 
relates to the accuracy of information in the interviews of the “community based 
organisations” in areas where interviewees spoke only Kirundi or Swahili. In these 
cases the information obtained was entirely dependent on the levels of interpreter 
used. A particular problem with this relate to the potential of some information 
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becoming lost in translating from one language to another. However, due to the fact 
that another French speaking person was always present during the interviews 
verified what my interpreter said. The accuracy of the information is assumed to have 
remained relatively high. Furthermore, in regards to the accuracy of information 
throughout the interviews conducted in the capital, my level of French is at a 
sufficiently high enough level to understand what was being said.  
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3. Theoretical Framework of civil society and 
democratisation 
The definition of the term “civil society” is wide ranging and diverse comprising of 
many different yet complex view-points. For this reason there are many theoretical 
interpretations of the term “civil society”-each being dependent and relevant within 
the specific context and domain in which the term is being used. Due to the 
ambiguity of the term, there exists a fundamental level of disagreement around its 
use. Consequently, there is a necessity to specify its meaning related to the context in 
which it is being applied in order for the concept to be both theoretically rewarding 
and analytically coherent (Sjøgren:2001:21).  
For the purpose of this thesis the theoretical framework that will be presented below 
intends to provide an in depth insight regarding why and how civil society can be 
seen as politically relevant in the ongoing democratisation process in Burundi. 
Furthermore, the thesis examines the role in which “civil society” can play as a 
constructive actor in the process towards influencing political change and further 
levels of democratisation throughout Burundi.  The theoretical framework used in 
this thesis will consists of wide range of theoretical approaches drawing on examples 
from a wider political context as well as drawing on more specifically concepts and 
approaches related to the subject of enquiry- the Burundi nation state. 
3.1 Civil Society and the general debate 
The section that follows will present a critique to the most utilised approach of the 
civil society namely the neo-liberal. My argument is that the neo- liberal perception 
of civil society fails to take into consideration that a civil society may differ in its 
role, depth and function proportionately to the context of enquiry. In relation to the 
Burundi nation state, one need to look into the historical structural processes in order 
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to thoroughly emphasise the role civil society may play in the ongoing 
democratisation process in Burundi. 
Civil society is often associated with democratisation and liberalisation, however in 
reality the concepts it embodies are far more extensive and profound. The political 
relevance of the term has been contested since its origins and there still exists 
confusion around its degree of utility for democracy (Chandhoke:1995:203). 
 Despite the concept of civil society embodying a long history which derived as a 
philosophical notion from the writings of Hegel, Gramsci and Marx, the current 
debate which views “civil society” as a tool for analysing politics- is a fairly recent 
revival of the theoretical and political concept that started during the 1980’s. The 
contemporary revival of the term has been seen as a consequence of the political 
liberalisation and democratisation in Latin America and Eastern Europe during the 
1980s and early 90s. Research attention where directed to the various forces within 
society, and the relations between state and society. Applying this debate within an 
African context, the relevance of civil society is often linked to the developmental 
and democratic failures of the mainly statist and sometimes authoritarian models- 
although the reasons for their failures are highly contested (Sjøgren:2001:36). 
In relation to this a further problem is the narrow definition for the concept of civil 
society within this approach. Civil society is presented as associational life in general, 
with voluntary organisations independent of the state, and this conceptualisation 
represents a particular notion of state and society, where the state represents power 
while the civil society belongs to the sphere of liberty and freedom. This narrow 
sovereign conception of power gives rise to a “romantic” view of civil society as  
being fully democratic and also implies that a transition to democracy can be 
achieved by organisations functioning outside the state limiting their power 
(Sjøgren:2001:52-54).   
The early 1990s witnessed the emergence of the WB’s “good governance” strategy 
together with a return of multi-party democracies on the African continent. The WB’s 
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liberal political scientists posed great expectations upon civil society as a force for 
democratisation and development. The introduction of the notion “good governance” 
to the development discourse came about in 1989 through a report called, Sub 
Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth, and to this day development 
discourse regarding democratisation of African nations remain highly influenced by 
this report (Abrahamsen:2000:52-53). 
In this context, the “good governance” strategy emphasise the importance of the 
emergence of associations such as informal, voluntary organisations, farming 
associations, women’s groups and professional associations throughout the African 
continent over the past decade. Even though an increase in the numerous associations 
such as those noted above has occurred in Africa, the “good governance” 
presupposition that civil society and the organisations that constitute it are of an 
inherently democratic character is contentious and often questionable which lacks 
common agreement- particularly within the context of Africa.  
Various scholars such as Diamond and Chazan, while differing in their holistic views 
of civil society are similar in that they exclude ethnic or other types of primordial 
organisations. As a result, the perspectives of Diamond and Chazan overlook the 
power dimensions within civil society. This particular view has a tendency to 
exaggerate and isolate the separation between state and civil society to the extent that 
we are left with a reified dichotomy rather than a framework which allows for a 
relational analysis of how state and society are separated and united in specific 
contexts. In other words, it obscures more than it reveals in regards to what forces in 
society that are likely to contribute to political change.  
Consequently, this neo-liberal view of civil society will neither be used for the 
purpose of this thesis which derives from a specifically African context nor in 
discussion relating to the subject of enquiry.  
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Mamdani (1996), criticises the neo-liberalist good governance view of civil society 
which in his view tends to glorify civil society and conceptualise it as being internally 
homogenous and democratic and externally opposing the state.  
Mamdani (1996) characterises it as a methodological bias and a clear unwillingness 
to concretely analyse ‘actual civil society’. Following on from this, a neo-liberalistic 
normative description of civil society lead us to an analytical prescription and 
confusion of how we want civil society to be (normative) rather than focusing on how 
it actually is. If one believes that civil society always represent democratic values one 
looses the analytical function of civil society. Neo-liberalists do not take into 
consideration that a civil society differ in its role, depth, and function in different 
contexts. One can argue that these structural elements are crucial when analysing 
which role civil society can play in a democratisation process (Sjøgren:2001:35). 
My approach to the concept of civil society refers to urban independent local CSO’s 
and rural communitarian associations and the complexities within the structure and 
capacity of these organisations. In other words, the concept “civil society” in this 
context and which will be used for the purpose of the thesis is a collective of 
institutions whose members are represented in a complex of domestic non-state actors 
who indirectly or directly promote or struggle for political change(Grugel:2002:95-
96).  
It is interesting to emphasise that the neo-liberalist understanding of civil society 
presented above, often does not pay attention to the question of power. However, in 
order to use civil society analytically the concept should be referred to as a conflictive 
practise related to power. In other words it refers to a struggle about who is justified 
to define the common goals and furthermore in which way they should be addressed. 
Consequently it is of great importance to identify who is active in civil society and 
how citizenship is constructed in order to analyze its democratic potential 
(Grugel:2002:94-95).   
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From the discussion above, I will argue that one should not import the concept of 
civil society in relation to Africa directly from the neo-liberal perspective deriving 
from the West. However, it makes little sense to create a definition that is totally 
unrelated to the Western tradition. Nevertheless, the concept needs to open up for the 
rich associational life that exists in Africa today. Therefore the concept of civil 
society with regards to this thesis allows for the inclusion of a wide array of political 
activities, whether they are long established or more recent. The theoretical reflection 
made with regards to civil society also needs to be put into a larger context in relation 
to democracy and the process of democratisation.  
3.2 Civil society and Democratisation  
The way one defines democracy influences the assessment of its existence and 
quality. There are many various interpretations of the prerequisites necessary to 
obtain a democracy and as a result the concept ‘democracy’ remains somewhat 
unclear and at times even highly contested (Beetham:2005:1) 
The minimalist and Shumpeterian definitions of liberal democracy allocate little 
room for civil society and focus mainly on variables such as free and fair elections, 
some civil and political rights and majority rule. Many African scholars criticise the 
way in which the liberal democracy definition has been applied within an African 
context and see it as irrelevant due to its Western origin (Abrahamsen:2000:69-73). 
More recent contributions operate with a broader democratic definition such as 
Beetham (2005:5) who proposes that ‘Democracy should be defined in terms of its 
underlying principles and only secondly in terms of the institutions that uphold 
them’.  
Grugel(2002:92) follow in the same direction when he argues that democracy 
requires that subordinate groups should be able to obtains the resources necessary to 
play an important role within civil society and consequently with regard to the state. 
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For the purpose of this thesis, democracy will not only be seen as the establishment 
of governing political institutions but more profoundly as the creation, extension and 
practice of social citizenship. It is of great importance to identify who is active in 
civil society and how citizenship is constructed in order to analyze its democratic 
potential (Grugel:2002:92-95). In this approach the focus is driven away from the 
view where the state is seen in isolation from the society and focuses on the 
interactive state-society relation and the power constellations within the society as a 
whole. 
With regards to democratisation the role of civil society in that process is contestable. 
The neo-liberal perspective (Diamond:1994 et al) view civil society essentially as an 
aid to the state while the radical perspective view the function of civil society as 
reforming the state. This thesis represents neither of these two approaches. 
Democratisation will combine these two elements which leave us with a notion of 
democratisation viewing the democratic function of civil society in its engagement 
with the state as a force for change (Grugel:2002:95-96).  
Democratisation of the state can be seen as changes in the balance of power among 
different political forces and of state-society relations so that the state in the process 
becomes more autonomous from dominant political classes and social groups and 
correspondingly more embedded among and responsive to subordinate ones 
(Sjøgren:2007: 23). 
Moreover, from an analytical perspective the role of the citizenship in this respect is 
tied up to the conflicting interactions related to power and the constant struggle 
between who is entitled to say what in the process of defining common problems and 
the means with which to face them. Emphasising on citizenship in terms of 
democratisation directs us to analyse the social relationships and power struggles 
among various groups in society and forces us to view that democracy also operates 
on the micro-level of social relationships and not just on the macro-level of 
institutions (Grugel:2002:11-12).  
 31
In the case of Burundi, citizenship has been tied up to ethnicity. The Tutsi have been 
seen as the ones holding the political power, while the Hutus in many ways have been 
excluded from the political arena. Consequently there has been a power struggle 
between these two ethnic groups over political power. 
Following from this the next sections of this chapter will put the civil society concept 
into an African context which will be used for the purpose of my thesis further on. 
3.3 Civil Society and State relations in an African context 
In this section I argue that one need to look upon civil society in Africa with regards 
to history. One need to view that the civil society is not static rather it evolves over 
time in relation to the structural changes of power.  
Since the end of the Cold War, a new view of underlying causes of the African 
conflicts that have engrossed the continent for years have emerged among African 
intellectuals. These views have emphasised not only the importance of political 
institutions but also the role in which “civil society” can play as a counterbalance or 
even scrutinize the state(Abrahamsen:2000:52-56). 
However, according to Chabal and Daloz (1999), civil society in Africa represents an 
“illusion”. Their argument is based on the idea that a concept that derives from a 
distinct period of European history is irrelevant in explaining politics on a continent 
with a distinctively different cultural and political setting.  
The loose interpretation of the term civil society is highly problematic as it is often 
represented as a conceptual rag bag standing as a sharp contrast to the more specific 
manner as represented in political theory (Chandhoke:1995:38). Chabal and Daloz go 
as far as to claim that ‘there are no evidence of functional civil society in Africa apart 
from clientilistic considerations of identity’ (Chabal,Daloz:1999:14-15). They 
represent a theory named-political instrumentalization of disorder. This theory claims 
that the colonial powers never institutionalized the colonial state. 
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The arguments made by Chabal and Daloz (1999) are based on the use of a normative 
explanation of civil society. As mentioned previously in this chapter, this notion of 
civil society obscures more than it reveals as it fails to consider the actual existing 
civil society in relation to the specific historical context. 
The debate around civil society has, as highlighted, been absorbed with the notion of 
a liberal civil society. As a consequence, non-Western sensibilities have often 
criticised the notion for being Eurocentric. The liberal definition of civil society- 
which focuses on the social arena between the state and the individual lead to the 
conclusions that state based political organizations and Western style individualism 
are unproblematic universals (Chazan:1992:73). However, politics cannot be 
exclusively analysed from the point of view of state institutions. The contemporary 
revival of the term “civil society” which takes a more political viewpoint and which 
serves as a critique and a challenge to the "top-down” notion of society-state relations 
therefore perhaps encompasses a more holistic understanding of the concept. In my 
point of view if the impact on African realities of the idea of civil society is to be fully 
understood, its terms must be read against the specificities of local histories 
(Comaroff, Comaroff:1999:27-28). Even those who aim to include the historical and 
cultural specificity of civil society often fall into the trap of wanting an universally 
applicable theoretical tool. In other words, civil society, even when recognized as a 
normative Western construct, nevertheless, has a way of presenting this as the only 
viable option for developing politics. This has resulted in scholars displaying 
ambivalence in using the term “civil society” as an analytical tool in an African 
context (Garland:1999:73-74).  
According to Ekeh(1992), there exists a misrepresentation of the role exercised by the 
civil society that arises from an unqualified application of the Western construct of 
civil society to the African situation. In the West civil society arose as a 
counterbalance and check to the totalitarian state, whereas civil society in Africa has 
historically evolved around a social welfare construct that represents the functions 
that the state could not or would not perform (Osaghae:1995:193-194). 
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This definition does not sufficiently reflect the diversity and strength of the CSO’s 
that exist in Africa today. Nevertheless, it is a reminder that there is a need for a non-
Western approach to the civil society perspective. It is not analytically relevant to 
only talk about individual organisations in terms of their opportunity to challenge the 
state as have been done by Western scholars. The western scholars often exclude 
organisations of kinship and ethnicity in the definition of civil society, which are 
relevant to discuss within the African civil society. This exclusion has had a 
significant impact on social movements throughout Africa particularly in the rural 
areas where organisations tend to be more ethnically based and where primary 
objective most of all is an expression of needs and not necessarily to antagonise the 
state (Osaghae:1995:194).  
Political scientists often conclude from the relative absence of voluntary associations 
in Africa that the continent suffers from a weak civil society. Yet, civil society cannot 
be utilised as an analytical tool if it represents an absence. I argue that the focus needs 
to be directed so that the concept enables us to identify those forces and institutions 
that do have some potential for producing a more productive engagement between 
state and society (Karlstrøm:1999:106).Considerations of institutional variations in 
new democracies need to be complemented by an understanding of their underlying 
political dynamics, but also a clear comprehension of how and with what result 
individuals and groups gain access to political power and what they do with this 
power once they obtain it (Haynes:2002:254). 
Gibbon for instance, criticises civil society theory for idealising both the character of 
the organisations that constitute this sphere and also their capacity and tendency to 
challenge the power relations in society. He stresses the fact that associations within 
civil society are not automatically participatory, democratic or accountable referring 
internally within the organisation or their ideological orientation. Many CSO’s in 
Africa represent ethnic, kinship, family values and therefore have nothing to do with 
democratic values and opposing the state (Sjøgren:2001:39).  
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The argument is not based on the fact that theorising and generalising ambitions 
should be left out rather it argues that they should be directed more empirically as 
opposed to deductively based. Characterising the state as oppressive and the civil 
society as democratic will cover up the real power interrelations between the state 
and society, including the relations of power domination and conflict that exist within 
civil society and the informal sector. Gibbon is weary of general formulations of a 
neutral plural civil society arguing that a civil society is structurally differentiated due 
to relations, cleavages and forms of organisations. Organisations individually interact 
with the state in various ways, and the relations vary from confrontational to 
clientilistic. Consequently, a- historical (liberalistic) comprehension of civil society 
will not explore the forces that sustain and produce it. (Sjøgren:2001:40)  
I therefore argue that one need to take into account the historical structural processes 
when analysing the civil society in Burundi. Mamdani (1996) support my argument 
when he argues that the western liberal construct of civil society is a-historical way of 
analyzing a continent where history played a crucial role in explaining the various 
countries state-society relations. His critique also emphasises the neglect of rural 
conditions and the institutional particularities of urban and rural state form in Africa. 
His approach towards politicisation, collective identities and democratisation is 
rooted in colonialism and their institutionalisation of what he refers to as the 
“bifurcated state” (Mamdani:1996:16-23). 
Neither accountability to local structures, nor participation was given priority by the 
colonial authorities. In this state-form, the urban areas were governed by civil law 
and racial exclusion from civil society while the rural areas were governed by 
customary law and further marked by authoritarian inclusion into separated ethnic 
traditional units.  In Burundi the Hutu’s were transformed into a deprived native 
identity while the Tutsi into a privileged settler identity (Mamdani:2002).  In these 
rural areas each tribe was declared a homogenous cultural unit and the chief of this 
unit had ultimate power which led to what Mamdani(1996:37) calls “decentralised 
despotism”. In the wake of independence, the urban civil society was “deracialised”, 
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but the rural areas were never “detribialised”, let alone democratised. Struggles were 
related to local contexts even though ethnicity as a form of power also contributed to 
it (Sjøgren:2001:40).  
The construction of citizenship is an important element to take into account when 
studying a country such as Burundi, where ethnic conflict has raged over the last 
decade. One can argue that the construction of citizenship in Burundi has changed as 
a consequence of colonial settlement. In Burundi the social categories of Tutsi, Hutu 
and Twa shared a common culture language and belief system and there is evidence 
to show that what appeared to be socio-political differences were created during the 
colonial era (Daley:2006b:17).  
Based on the theoretical framework of Mamdani (1996), citizenship in Burundi was 
during the colonial time categorised in term of ethnicity whereas the Tutsi minority 
were in hold of the power, the Hutu were excluded from their political rights. In this 
way the colonisers influenced the societal structure making the citizens mobilise and 
identify themselves around their ethnic identity unknown from the past. 
Consequently, a historical analysis of changing state power and of resource access, 
and the intersection of these with ethnicity is of utterly importance to understanding 
inter-group conflict in Burundi (International Crisis Group:2007). 
It is also a necessary element to investigate when assessing the role of the civil 
society in Burundi is to view if citizenship remains tied up to identifications around 
ethnicity.  
My first argument is therefore that the historical construction of citizenship around 
ethnicity in Burundi has weakened the capacity of the CSO’s to gather around 
common political goals. Consequently this hampers the role and capacity of CSO’s 
as promoters for democracy.  
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3.4 The interchange between civil society and 
democratisation in an African context  
In this section I put forward the argument that democratisation in the Burundian 
context needs to be seen in the light of historical structural processes. When 
discussing democratisation, especially in a country like Burundi, one needs to take 
into account the previous attempts of transition, setbacks and areas of progress in 
order to use these as lessons for how to make it possible for a regime change to take 
place.  
The problem with the framework used to analyse democratic transition in Africa is 
embedded in the definition of the concept itself. One of the most established 
dimensions of modernisations theory and the Western construct of the transition 
process towards democracy is the role given to the strategic elite. In this view the 
transition process is defined as the interval between one regime and another. 
According to O’Donnell and Schmitter(1986), this involves an exclusion of the past 
and a construction of the future. The only main absolute requirement for transition to 
democracy is a commitment to democratisation on the part of the elite 
(Grugel:2002:48-51). This can be said to be democratisation from ‘above’, or what 
often is referred to as a top down approach, as it leaves little room and insight into 
context-specific actors and processes (Tørnquist, Stokke, Harris:2004:5). 
This particular view of “transition” does not undertake a thorough analysis of past 
transitions and progress recorded as the beginning point for present transition. This 
undermines the meaning of a transition as a historical and continuous process rather 
than a state of being. It is a (normative) a-historic construct ignoring the importance 
of a more suitable framework which not only includes the current social and political 
elements of a nation state but also includes past political and social changes. History 
is a basic, yet underrated dimension of the democratisation process. The impacts from 
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the past often reflects in countries transition toward a regime change 
(Pridham:2000:29) Transition is a continuation of previous attempts which for most 
countries and certainly for Burundi started with the transition from colonial rule. 
Even though this process has had many setbacks in terms of coups, authoritarian one-
party systems and military regimes it is crucial to address what went wrong earlier in 
the nation’s history and use these lessons in the analysis of transitions today 
(Osaghae:1995:188).  
“Path dependence means that history matters, we cannot understand today’s choices 
without tracing the incremental evolution of institutions. It is important to know more 
about the culturally derived norms and behaviour and how they interact with formal 
rules to get better answers to such issues ( Putnam:1993:181) 
 
Evidently the elite perspective can be useful when analysing the internal sources for 
democratic transition. It can also be used as a tool when analysing transitions 
managed by military elites such as in Nigeria and Ghana. Nevertheless it is not suited 
in the same way to analyse a forced transition which can be said to be the case of 
Burundi. Overemphasising the elite is also a problem because there is no guarantee 
that the elite themselves are committed to democratic principles. The perspective of 
elite serves more the interest of the Western powers. It also downplays the relevance 
of the ordinary peoples in the democratisation process (Osaghae:1995:190-192). 
Grugel (2002:92) criticises the most common literature on transitions to democracy 
as he claims it builds upon this minimalist definition and fails to include civil society 
as a component in the struggle towards democracy.  
It is important not to exclude the role of popular mobilization as it has in most cases 
played a crucial role in the initial development of democratisation 
(Haynes:2002:255). As pointed out earlier in this chapter there is however a need to 
view the actual impact of civil society with a critical lens as the democratic relevance 
of certain organizations can vary over time and space. Civil society groups that are 
ethnically based can be less dedicated to the idea of democracy where their motives 
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lie more in pursuing their own personal aspirations rather than achieving democracy 
in the interests of the nation as a whole (Haynes:2002:255). Grugel (2002) emphasise 
an important point in relation to this when he address that civil societies in practise 
are very different in their composition. Who exactly represent civil society and who 
does not? And what exactly is their role in the process? One need to consider these 
crucial elements when analysing the role the civil society can play in further 
enhancing a democratic development. 
Western scholars have emphasised the need to take local conditions into 
considerations in building democracy in Africa. Nevertheless, until present very little 
effort has actually been made to move beyond the prescriptive Western orientation. 
Frequently analysis of transitions in Africa derives from the frameworks of Latin 
American and Easter European experiences. These frameworks glorify the unilinear 
development assumptions and the triumph of American and Western liberal 
democracy (Osaghae:1995:186). Based on modernisation theory, this unilinear view 
on democracy points out that economic development is crucial to democracy and that 
underdeveloped countries are not ‘ripe for democracy’. However, the goal of 
fostering economical liberalisation through IMF and the WB proved insufficient in its 
efforts to promote the establishment of even the most basic of democracies. However, 
the experience in many parts of Africa has been that the efforts of economic 
liberalisation while intending to bring about positive societal change in fact lead to 
even greater levels of impoverished people enabling the environment for democracy 
in underdeveloped countries (Abrahamsen:2000:48). 
Diamond, one of the leading scholars on the globalisation of democracy school 
admits that the current democratisation is a Western construct and recommends that 
the West must assist the organic development in the particular ‘soil’ of each country, 
without imposing its own particular vision of how democracy should function 
(Osaghae:1995:186-187). However, the Western scholars view civil society from a 
purely consolidation perspective instead of focusing on the role people can play to 
make sure democracy serves their interests. These shortcomings give room for a 
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broader understanding of the dynamics of democratisation and the critical role that 
civil society can play in the process of democratic transition. This because viewing 
civil society mainly as ensuring the consolidation of democracy does not give a 
realistic picture of the capacity usually held by the African civil societies today.  
There is therefore a need to focus more on the interest of CSO’s whose activities do 
not explicitly relate to the democratic process and how they can be empowered by the 
process Put simply, if expectation of ordinary people is not taken into consideration, 
the very foundations of the new democracies could be threatened 
(Osaghae:1995:194).   
This section has made an attempt to explain that political transitions dominantly have 
been analyzed from a top- down perspective focusing on a narrow range of political 
processes and institutions. Critical rethinking of the transitions paradigm requires that 
structural factors, such as historical legacies and ethnic identities are important when 
determining the path of political transition. One can argue that there is a need to 
complement on the top-down approach by offering a bottom up perspective revealing 
the structural importance of civil society and the role of history and ethnicity in that 
context.  
From the theoretical perspectives presented above one can argue that the civil 
society should have a role in the democratisation process, however is this the case in 
Burundi? And what role can the civil society play in Burundi? 
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3.5 Political and financial autonomy in relation to 
democratisation 
Central to the civil society argument from a neo-liberal perspective and closely 
coupled to the state versus society construct, is the concern with autonomy of 
associational life vis a vis the state. This has become a key defining characteristic of 
civil society as well as a normative goal. Many scholars use autonomy as a 
prerequisite in their definition of civil society6. However, if autonomy from the state 
is inherent in the very definition of civil society, then this weakens the usefulness in 
explaining the processes of democratisation (Beckman:2001b:53).  In most of Africa 
the CSOs are not fully political or financially independent. 
Therefore the role of autonomous associational life with regards to democratisation 
needs to be established concretely in specific historical contexts, rather than being 
assumed as inevitable. This question needs to be addresses recognising the nature of 
conflicting interests in the balance between these in society at large, the state and the 
strategic option available. In relation to this thesis it is interesting to look upon the 
degree of autonomy the various CSO’s holds. 
 
 
 
 
                                              
6 Diamon, White, Taylor (Beckman:2001b:53). 
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3.6 The interplay of Kinship, Ethnicity, citizenship and 
Democratisation. 
This section aims to explain the importance of ethnicity and kinship within the 
African society. My argument is that one cannot exclude the notion of ethnicity and 
kinship when discussing the role of civil society in Burundi. As ethnicity still is 
bound up to the notion of citizenship, and kinship is a part of the social construction 
these dimension are important to discuss in order to comprehend the Burundian civil 
society.  
Generally in Africa the society has historically been built on kinship relations. 
However, within the context of the conventional western concept of civil society, 
kinship is not included as part of this domain. Seen as a part of  “private life” which 
stands in contrast to  the “public domain” of state and civil society in western 
thought, kinship is therefore excluded from the objective categorical conception of 
civil society (Karlstrøm:1999:106-107).  
The question that needs to be asked is whether the exclusion of kinship based 
associational forms of civil society is an appropriate approach to take within the 
context of the Burundian nation-state and its accompanying culture? This is because 
in Burundi- as in most African societies throughout the Sub-Saharan region- kinship 
cannot be viewed as a strictly “private” domain. As a contrast to European societies, 
kinship in Africa is seen as having both a private and a public face. An example of 
this can be seen in Uganda where the majority of people argue that the orderly 
ascending hierarchy of ranked lineages and clan heads (Bataka) and where the king is 
viewed as the “head of all the clan heads” produces the most stable, cohesive and 
responsive political order as possible.  
In Africa many countries have been affected by civil war after independence of the 
colonial powers that took place in the 1960s. As a consequence for almost all 
Burundians life has become polarized along ethnic lines.  
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According to Bayart, most situations where the structuring of the contemporary 
political arena seems to be articulated in terms of ethnicity this relates to identities 
that were not present a century ago or at least not divided in the same sense. 
Consequently, this suggests that contemporary ethnic conflict is a manufactured 
concept dating back to post-colonial modernization. Due to the fact that the notion of 
‘ethnic group’ was one of the ideological premises of the colonial administration, it 
became expedient for the groups to define their existence in this way As time passed, 
this ethnic division among the people became the relationship between the subject 
people themselves (Haynes:2002: 136-137). 
As mentioned earlier Chazan together with other scholars argues that associations 
based on ethnic identities together with those based on kinship are by definition 
erased from the concept of civil society. The argument is based on the fact that the 
engagement with the state is not considered constructive and because they are seen as 
promoting parochial rather than cross-cutting social solidarities (Comaroff, 
Comaroff:1999:109). Resulting from the intentional entrenchment of ethnic identities 
by the colonial powers together with the failure of most post-colonial African states 
to obtain stability among their subjects (people), it seems probable that the existing 
ethnic bonds and solidarities will not vanish or may even become weaker in Africa in 
the near future. Consequently, for the purpose of this thesis it seems inappropriate to 
exclude ethnic associations, when undertaking an in-depth and thorough analysis of 
Burunsi’s civil society and in its struggle for democracy. Mamdani (1996) 
characterises ethnicity as representing a biased role where on the one side it can fulfil 
the potential democratic and inclusive as well as nourish the authoritarian and 
exclusive forms of politics (Sjøgren:2001:41).  
Whatever the historical origins of ethnicity were, ethnic exclusion has come to 
dominate the Burundian society. Competing narratives of identity stand as the prime 
cause of conflict. As a result the conflict dynamics raise crucial questions in the 
search for an understanding of the politics of cultural pluralism and to the relationship 
 43
between the organisation of civil society and its implication for development in the 
country (Young:2006:25).  
The most relevant conceptualisation of civil society in this context is to consider civil 
society as consisting of non-state organizational activity regardless as to whether or 
not the organizations within the state conform to the classical norm of civility. 
Consequently, this will facilitate the assessment of the negative as well as the positive 
contributions of organizations to democratisation. The analytical task lies in gaining 
an understanding of the conditions under which these organisations can perform a 
constructive mediating role and the circumstances under which they become divisive 
and destructive (Karlstrøm:1999:110). 
To sum up, civil society and its relationship to democratisation cannot be understood 
in abstract terms, but it requires a thorough analysis of the various groups and 
interests involved in these struggles. The neo-liberalist view on civil society 
represents a somewhat harmonious equality-based sphere. The reality however is 
slightly different, and structures of power, hierarchies and wealth is rooted in every 
civil society. 
From the discussion made above, one can assume that ethnicity will be an important 
dimension within the Burundian civil society. As a natural outcome, it is important to 
investigate in depth how the relationships between these ethnic groups are explored 
within the local civil society in Burundi. 
 My argument is that ethnicity hampers the development of a vital civil society in 
Burundi.  
Only in the last decade have one dedicated more attention to the relationship between 
democracy and trust. This relates in particular to countries which are ethnically 
fragmented. It can be argued that generalized trust among people is favourable to 
desirable forms of democracy, while particularized trust to family or to members of 
ethnic or religious groups are less beneficial in a democratisation process 
(Warren:1999:1-3). Putnam (1993) argues that a civic culture of “generalized trust” 
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and social solidarity between citizens, who are willing and capable of organising 
together, and cooperate on common goals represent an important societal prerequisite 
for a vital democracy. Even though Putnam’s work in relation to this context is 
unsatisfactory due to his narrow definition of civil society, he does underline an 
important aspect regarding trust and democracy. 
Differences among oppositional groups regarding ideology as well as short term 
goals are central strategic dilemmas that influence the ability to cooperate 
(Posusney:2005:94) and Dahl( 1971:115) argues that 
“Incentives toward cooperation are stronger when each subculture cannot form a 
majority capable of governing except by entering into a coalition with representatives 
of other subcultures.”  
The possibility of cooperation is therefore weakened if a country is split in two 
subcultures, where one is a majority and the other a minority. This is seen in the case 
of Burundi, where the ruling Tutsi represent 14 percent of the population and the 
Hutus the other 85 percent. In this situation the majority group Hutu has fewer 
incentives for being conciliatory towards the minority, since they have the strength to 
form a majority coalition among themselves. Furthermore, the minority also has few 
incentives to act conciliatory, because of fears of permanent political domination of 
the majority (Dahl:1971:116). Until 1993 in Burundi, the ruling group has been the 
minority Tutsi. The majority Hutu has been politically excluded for years. This has 
clearly intensified the ethnic divide which is still persistent in Burundi. 
Furthermore, Dahl emphasise the importance of trust in order to obtain a democratic 
system (Dahl:1971:150) Dahl argues that in “at least three ways, mutual trust favours 
“polyarchy” and public contestation while extreme distrust favour hegemony”. The 
first reason for this is the fact that within a democracy two-way or mutual 
communication is necessary and obtaining two-way communication between people 
who do not trust one another is difficult to achieve. Secondly, a degree of mutual trust 
is necessary in order for people to organise voluntarily in search for their own 
preferences. Levin argues that the extreme distrust between Ethiopian groups can 
partly explain the lack of organisation around common interests and preferences “The 
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mutual distrust and lack of cooperation which inform the political climate of the 
country are directly related to a very low regard for man’s capacity for solidarity and 
consensus…The idea that it is possible to transcend the prevailing atmosphere of 
anxiety and suspicion by trusting one another…has been slow to appear and 
extremely rare”. The third explanation to the fact that lack of trust can lead to 
hegemony, is that conflict are more threatening for people who do not trust each other 
in the first place. Competition which serve as an important element within a 
democracy, demands a whole lot of trust between the opponents: they can be 
competitors but not enemies (Dahl 1971:151-152) 
My argument is that the distrust that exists between the Hutu and the Tutsi impedes 
the vertical as well as the horizontal cooperation making it difficult to cooperate and 
mobilise around common democratic goals.  A question important to address in that 
respect is if the CSO’s function as consolatory or dividing with regards to 
establishing trust among the ethnic groups? 
 
In order to understand the present one needs to understand the past. To analyse civil 
society and its role within the Burundi society today it is first of all necessary to have 
a thorough understanding of the societal and political challenges which the nation has 
encountered. This chapter aims to gain insight into and understand how ethnic 
relations and structural power dimensions have evolved in Burundi throughout 
history. The focus will primarily be on how and why social identities have evolved. 
My argument is based on the fact that ethnicity was a cultural identity before the 
colonial period. However, during colonial and post-colonial time ethnicity was 
transformed into a source of political differentiation and mobilisation leading up to 
acts of violence between the Hutu and the Tutsi respectively. The division between 
the two ethnic groups is still applicable to the contemporary Burundian society 
posing a challenge to the development of viable civil society functioning as a viable 
contributor towards democracy. 
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4. From bloodshed to hope in Burundi? 
4.1 Introduction 
The countless events plaguing the Great Lakes Region since the late 1980’s has 
attracted much attention. Since its independence Africa had never seen so much 
violence and so much killing in one place and on so many occasions as in the case of 
Burundi. Despite the atrocities that took place, news from Burundi has been largely 
marginalised compared to its neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, the Burundi 
history has been- and continues to be highly turbulent.  
Burundi has been affected of low-intensity warfare since the end of the colonial era in 
1961. An estimated number of 330.000 died in the genocide killings of 1972 and 
1988. Moments of hope were present in the phase of the early 1990’s, when African 
countries moved towards multiparty democracy. For a moment it appeared that 
Burundi was to be one of the promising candidates for civil reform. The outcome of 
the 1993 elections was immediately described by one, western scholar as “one of the 
most remarkable transitions to democracy yet seen in Africa” (Lemarchand: 1995: 
xi). However, the reality that followed proved to be quite different.  
The enhancement of the democratic transition came to a halt when the first Hutu 
President Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated by the Tutsi opposition. This event 
threw Burundi toward another decade of civil strife and ethnic conflict killing more 
than 300.000 people together with 600.000 fleeing the country (Daley:2007a:306, 
Herrisse:2000:1).7 A peace agreement was settled in 2005 and Burundi experienced 
its first democratic election where the voters approved of a power-sharing 
constitution, including both Hutu and Tutsi. However, despite the signing of a peace 
agreement, total peace has not yet returned to the region and the civil state of Burundi 
                                              
7 The exact numbers are not precise due to the fact that the numbers vary from source to source (Lemarchand:1995). 
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has been characterised as being in a state of “no peace-no war”(International crisis 
groups:2007). The peace agreement has recognised that governance and ‘structural 
violence’ are at the root of Burundi’s civil conflict. However it fails to address the 
complexity of politics in both Africa and in Burundi. The agreement views the actors 
of African politics as international actors, the domestic political elite and the armed 
movements, excluding the civil society (Daley: 2006a:304). 
An assessment of some of the root causes of the current crisis in Burundi will include 
an analytical description of the nation’s history. The affect history has had on the 
societal and power structures in Burundi will in turn affect the function or 
dysfunction of current civil society. In order to analytically view the role civil society 
can play in the ongoing democratisation process, the development of power structures 
within the Burundian society and the role of ethnicity needs to be addressed 
(Herisse:2000:1). Consequently, undertaking an historical analysis of changing state 
power, local power and resource access, and their intersection with ethnicity is of 
critical importance in understanding  inter-group conflict in Burundi 
(Daley:2006b:7). 
In Burundi, ethnicity, has been the central organising principle of the modern state 
with its successive policies of differentiation and exclusion. The ongoing violence is 
linked to an increasingly, factionalised political elite, based on the cleavages found in 
Burundian society, who mobilise ethnicity in their struggle for control over the state. 
(Daley: 2006b:1). Peace efforts conducted over the past couple of years have made 
efforts aimed at correcting the ethnic imbalance through power-sharing and reform of 
governmental institutions. However, these efforts alone are unlikely to resolve the 
political crisis. This is primarily because they not only fail to address the complex 
social reality of Burundi society but they do not include the people of Burundi as part 
of a broader non-ethnic political community serving as a prerequisite for a stable 
democracy (Daley: 2006b:1). 
Presently, there is no scholarly consensus to the degree of impact colonialism had on 
the stratification of the Burundi society into ethnic rivalries. It can be said that, 
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‘Radically divergent interpretations of history provide the basis upon which 
collective identities are built and act as powerful justifications of current behaviour’ 
(Uvin:1999:254). 
Burundi is known for being an oral society which complicates the exact nature of 
history (Uvin:1999:254). Both scholars and people in Burundi disagree upon 
historical accounts about ethnicity as a political factor. However, Gurr argues that it 
is of little relevance to know the precise nature of pre-colonial relations between Hutu 
and Tutsi arguing that: 
“ The key to identifying communal groups is not the presence of a particular trait or 
combination of traits, but rather the shared perception that the defining traits, 
whatever they are, set the group apart” ( Uvin:1999:255). 
 
The relevance of this is that even if it is hard to understand the exact nature of when 
and how ethnicity became a defining trait, the most important is to understand that at 
the end of independence, the population of Burundi identified themselves in 
accordance to ethnicity. 
4.2 Burundian history and background of the conflict 
Pre-colonial time 
Unlike many states in Africa, the state of Burundi was not a colonial construct. It 
existed prior to colonial rule although its boundaries were extended as a result of 
colonial conquest of neighbouring territories. Burundian pre-colonial history was 
characterised by various social identities coexisting, and sometimes even overlapping 
(Daley:2006b:6-7). The categories of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa existed in Burundian pre-
colonial history. However, there appears to be no evidence of ethnic conflict between 
these three ethnic groups during this time.  
In order to understand how this polarisation came about it is important to investigate 
what took place under colonial rule. It can be argued that the societal structure from 
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pre-colonial Burundi should leave better preconditions for democracy to transpire 
than other countries in Africa. However, the arrival of colonial powers did something 
to the nation’s social structure creating “ethnic” groups hostile to one another. 
4.2.1 Colonial Rule 
Burundi was first a part of the German colony of Ruanda-Urundi (1897-1916) up 
until its defeat in the First World War. As a consequence Burundi was placed under 
Belgian control until its independence in 1962.  
The Belgian colonisers observed from the beginning that in Burundi the ruling group 
was the Ganwa (princes)8 followed by the Tutsi. Within this social structure, while 
some Hutu did occupy posts as landowners or political or religious leaders, they did 
not however, hold as many high status positions as the Tutsi and the Ganwa 
(Krueger:2007:25). The minority Twa, on the other hand was totally marginalized in 
the social structure (Krueger:2007:26). 
The Belgian colonial take over left permanent indications of its presence within the 
Burundi society. The Belgians, like many other colonialists, found governance easier 
if exercised through a fixed, formal, hierarchical social structure. As a consequence 
they introduced pre-conceptions of racial superiority and applied their biased 
interpretations in favour of the Tutsi to the hierarchical social structure of the pre-
colonial society. They awarded employment of authority to the Tutsi  and left the 
Hutu and the Twa the assignment of tilling the soil (Krueger:2007:26). This led the 
Hutu’s with the feeling of being “ripped off” from the responsibility and the 
privileges they previously had possessed hardening the boundaries between the two 
ethnic groups. The colonial powers introduced “indirect rule”, where what has been 
                                              
8 Ganwa where the real powerholders in the traditional society, and where not identified with either Hutu or Tutsi 
(Lemarchand:1995:15) 
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later called the ‘Hamitic hypothesis’9 was used to justify European support for the 
minority Tutsi as natural leaders. The implementation of indirect rule made it 
possible for the Belgians to ‘combine exploitation with neglect’ and they did almost 
nothing to develop, educate or cultivate the general African population 
(Krueger:2007:27).  
Under Belgian rule the indigenous population were classified into racial groupings 
where the superior Tutsi, were those who where pastoralists and who had Caucasian 
features. The label “Hutu” was given to those defined as cultivators with negroid 
features and classification. Twa was assigned to those who were hunters and gathers 
with pygmoid features.10 This racial classification subsequently and unsurprisingly 
led to notions of superiority and inferiority (Daley:2006b:8).    
In addition to the above mentioned as a destabilising effect the colonial powers 
introduced the “race” myth and the notion of “ethnicity”. Furthermore, the 
incorporation of traditional power structures into the “indirect rule” favoured by the 
colonial administration resulted in exclusion of the indigenous courts, the 
Bashingantahe. These actions combined resulted in a loss of a common Burundi 
destiny. Hence creating ethnocentrism, an ideology of ethnic supremacy adopted into 
segments of the population creating cleavages difficult to heal (Herrisse:2000:). 
According to Drayton (1995:10) ‘Colonialism created a situation whereby a single 
identity, ethnicity, was prioritised over the multiplicity of identities held by the 
African people’. In Burundi this resulted in a transformation of the political culture, 
leading to the downfall of the existing “national consensus” (Daley:2006:b7).   
Mamdani(1996) explains it as, 
                                              
9 A myth imported from 19th century Europe, which placed yet another construction on the history of Tutsi hegemony 
(Lemarchand:1999)  
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“The politics of Africanization was simultaneously unifying and fragmentation: 
unifying the victims of colonial racism but dividing the same majority along ethnic 
lines that reflected the actual process of redistribution”. 
The colonial powers discriminated the Hutus in favour of the Tutsi, excluding the 
Hutus from political power. How this affected the socio political context of Burundi 
will be deliberated on below. 
4.2.2 The socio-political context of Burundian civil society  
One can argue that there exist a gap between the country’s national leaders and 
Burundi’s grass-root organisations. This is a result of the brutal decades of civil war 
which has contributed to the construction of a population deeply cynical and 
alienated regarding their leaders as self-serving, corrupt and unresponsive. However, 
the civil society existing in Burundi is not static; it evolves over time together with 
historical processes and the change of power that has taken place in the country. It 
has been argued by the WB that over the last couple of years the Burundi local civil 
society has gone through a positive development (Brachet,Wolphe:2005:2). 
However, there is no documented analysis over what this encounters.  
Historically, in Burundi the concept of civil society and associational groupings were 
absorbed into the political system, as well as in the social and cultural structure of the 
society. As mentioned in chapter 3, the identity of Burundians in that period was 
related to kinship and lineages. Consequently, civil society was absorbed into these 
kinship and familial relations. As for the most part,  traditional rulers were born rather 
than elected or appointed, therefore ‘civil society’ did not need to be as actively 
involved in the choice of leaders as they are in a democratic system of governance 
that is emerging in Africa now and in Burundi respectively (Makumbe:1998:306). 
Critics of civil society in Africa and those who claim that civil society has no 
meaningful function in this context, fail to realize that unlike most developed 
countries, the countries in Africa have undergone major obstacles to the development 
of its civil society since the beginning of colonialism (Makumbe:1998:310). During 
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colonial time in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa the formation of civic groups were 
discouraged. The only politically active CSO’s during the colonial era were those 
whose membership comprised the settlers and the colonizers themselves. These 
organisations excluded Africans in general. Thus, in rural areas the religious 
associations were well established (Makumbe:1998:307). 
However, Prince Rwagasore11 contributed to the emergence of a nationalist combat 
among the population. In 1958, right before Burundi gained their independence the 
first elite of intellectuals graduated from the University of Burundi. This gave roots to 
the emergence of associations more or less autonomous. The vitality of the various 
labour and student movements that took place in the period of 1960-1966 was a result 
of the desire to escape from the clientelistic politics that had marked the era of 
colonisation12  
 Despite the emergence of various associational formations in Burundi prior to 1990, 
these organisations were highly repressed by the authoritarian regime at the time. 
Their opportunities to speak up and to express their opinions freely were limited. The 
concept of a civil society in Burundi primarily took form with the emergence of the 
democratic development of multiparty democracies in Africa in the early 1990’s. 
Nevertheless the meaning of the notion civil society and its role remained vague. 
Legally the local civil society gained a sustainable foothold in relation to the state in 
April 1992 with a Public Law favouring the creation of local non-governmental 
organization (Herisse:2000:14). The launching of the new law led to more than a 
thousand organisations legally registered together with more than five thousand 
associations establishing in the rural areas of Burundi. However, the majority of these 
organisations were usually one dimensional, predominantly unisex, limited in their 
membership (ethnicity), capacity, and purpose, and more often existed in name alone 
                                              
11 The son of king Mwambutsa IV, the hero of Burundian independence, he was assassinated 13 of October 1961 just 
before Burundi gained its official independence the 1 of July 1962.  
12 Interview: Melchior, Ndayishimiye      
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with one person assuming all leadership positions (Herisse:2000:5). Today, while 
many grassroots organizations genuinely do represent the interests and needs of the 
local citizenry, many are also connected with local elite groups that promote their 
own vested interests. Hence, it is important to keep in mind that Burundi has only had 
one decade in which to construct a civil society capable of effectively protecting and 
promoting the interests of citizens.  
From the sections presented above one can argue that ethnicity and clientelism often 
associated with many African states is also represented within the Burundian society. 
This has led to severe ramifications for the development of a Burundian civil society.  
Consequently, these dimensions will be further elaborated on in the sections below. 
4.3 The pivotal role of ethnicity in the Burundian society. 
There exist two main hypotheses with regards to ethnicity and how the ethnic groups 
came about. One view argues for the fact that there is no difference between Hutu and 
Tutsi (Chretien:1995). While the other (Reyntjens:1995) Lemarchand (1994), who 
argue that Hutu and Tutsi were originally different peoples, with different origins and 
that differences are socio-biological. Historical evidence to prove one or the other is 
difficult. However, popular proverbs dated before colonial rule mentioning Hutu, 
Tutsi and Twa and historical accounts of a societal hierarchy indicate that the 
categories existed before arrival of the colonial powers. 
However, this highlights how volatile the situation was to political manipulation that 
favoured specific versions of history. This thesis will argue the fact that the ethnic 
categorisation existed before colonial time and that “ethnicity” as a concept of 
identity and power evolved with the colonisation period. 
In Burundi the narrative of identity is highly contested and revolves around different 
historical readings. However, there exists a scholarly consensus that agriculturalists 
and pastoralists have long existed in symbiosis in the region of Great Lakes. The 
ethnonyms took form in the 19th century and their generalization was likely linked to 
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political centralization. The generalization, primoridalization and racialization of the 
Hutu- Tutsi difference were a product of Belgian colonial rule. Tutsi as the “ruling 
group” rule-ship was systematized and its range of functions greatly expanded by the 
Belgian colonisers (Young:2006:17).  
What needs to be asked is why has ethnicity become the catalyst for violence as 
opposed to other lines of social cleavages? 
The question of the role of ethnicity in explaining the conflict in Burundi has 
possessed a central place in the literature. The conflict in Burundi has often been 
characterised as clashes between the two main ethnic groups, namely the Hutu and 
Tutsi (Ndikumana:2005:415). Lemarchand (1995:1) points out a crucial 
characteristically ‘paradox’ in the history of Burundi. This paradox can be explained 
through the fact that unlike other sub-Saharan African countries, historically the 
ethnic groups in  Burundi are marked by a relatively peaceful cohabitation, speaking 
the same language, sharing the same culture and in addition submitted to the same 
monarchical structure (Ndikumana:2005:415). Consequently, it is of importance to 
elaborate on history in order to understand why ethnicity became the generating 
factor of violent conflict.  
4.3.1 Ethnicity and Patron- Client Relationship 
In pre-colonial times, patron-client relationship was once the linchpin of Burundi 
society. Essentially this was a relationship of exchange between individuals of 
unequal status, between a client who searched for protection and a patron with 
wealth. Much has been said about the nature of patron-client relationships linked to 
the idea of protection and oppression. However, in Burundi there was a certain 
stability within this relationship. Nevertheless, the cohesion that existed could not 
persist in an environment of war and ethnic conflict and patron-client ties served only 
to accelerate the process of ethnic polarization. The language of “clientelism” give 
crucial clues to an understanding of the cultural frame of the patron-client framework 
consequently, focusing on the normative aspects of power relationships 
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(Lemarchand:1995:11-12). Inequality was the precondition for social exchange and 
the motive for seeking the protection of a superior. What can be said is that Burundi 
represented a highly complex society where ethnic affiliations were by no means in 
the past the most reliable indicator of social ranking. Kinship and clan ties where the 
indicators shaping the order, and through clientage ties one could improve the 
chances in life which added another variable to the already complex social structure. 
However, shortly before the independence one could clearly see separate ethnic 
identities who developed in pace with the social change that took place, and the 
constant growing political competition (Lemarchand:1995:13-14)  
Ethnicity is clearly politicised. This phenomenon is well explained by Alphonse 
Rugabarara,   
“The use of the term Hutu and Tutsi reflects a deliberate effort to create and maintain 
a Tutsi ideology and a Hutu ideology….. These two ideologies, born in the womb of 
the political class shortly before independence, have created and maintained this so-
called ethnic consciousness, which may not have come into being had the experience 
of politics been lived and defined differently….. Behind the problem of definitions 
(of ethnic categories) lies a problem of perception”(Lemarchand:1995:14).  
 
In other words, ethnicity has been politicised and manipulated by the elite for 
political gains. In Burundi where the majority of the population suffer from 
analphabetisms and 37.613 of the population lives below the poverty line, political 
manipulation is conducted more easily than if the population was politically 
autonomous and economically independent. The reason why the Tutsi elite was able 
to mobilise people around ethnicity was the historical patterns of integration of 
citizen and subject established by the Belgian colonial state, where Tutsi were the 
citizens holding the political power, while the Hutus where the subjects, almost 
entirely excluded from the political arena. (Mamdani:1996).  
                                              
13 Human Development Index (2007), Burundi was ranked 81 out of 108 developing countries. 
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Consequently, Burundi went from a country once having a complex social structure 
to becoming a simplistic society where ethnicity served as the main social 
identification reducing all other social roles (Lemarchand:1995:14-15). Citizenship 
became related to ethnic identification and the political discourse was between the 
Hutu and the Tutsi. Unsurprisingly, the Pygmoid Batwa, was excluded from the 
public discourse and the princely elite Ganwa were assimilated within the Tutsi elite. 
Resultantly, the Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy was enforced which has led to deep-rooted 
suspicions, massacres, wastage of resources and general insecurity and confusion 
leading to various political and social roles that were of importance for the cohesion 
of a national identity vanished (Udogu:1995:799).  
4.3.2 Ethnicity and the political culture of post-colonial Burundi 
The monarchy survived the colonial period to a certain degree through social strength 
which resulted in the royalist and biethnic party UPRONA being established. 
UPRONA was led by a prince named Louis Rwagasore who won elections in 1961 
(Uvin:1999:256). One pivotal factor to the violence that arose was the assassination 
of Rwagasore by the opposition leaving the party in internal conflict. Competition for 
state power suddenly became between three groups: the Tutsi- Hima, the Tutsi-
Banyaruguru and a small up and coming Hutu elite.  
However, the independence movement started off violently. The first deadly conflict 
occurred in the late 1950s and the early 1960s with the rise of nationalist movements. 
Directly following the de-colonisation, in the year of 1966 Burundi experienced a 
Coup d’Ètat led by Micombero. This group consisting of Tutsi- Hima controlled the 
army and after their force came into power they excluded other Tutis and all Hutus 
from the political competition for power.14As a result of this coup up until 1993 
political and economic power in Burundi was held by three military regimes namely, 
Micombero from 1966 to 1982, Bagaza from 1982-1987 and Buyoya from 1987 to 
                                              
14 Interview: Melchior, Ndayishimiye 
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1983(UNDP:2006:6-8). Each used their military positions and their power to 
maintain their privileges. Given that all these military leaders represented the Tutsi-
Hima group it meant that all the most important positions within a society were held 
by this specific group (Uvin:1999:257). 
As the colonisation arguably has played a central role in Burundi’s ethnic civil unrest, 
one of the elements that will be emphasised throughout this thesis is that political 
identities and structures needs to bee seen in the light of history. 
Mamdani (2001:21-22) emphasise this fact and argues that political identities emerge 
from ‘the process of state formation’ and therefore political identities need to be 
understood in the light of history of state formation. During this process identities are 
generated in terms of a group’s access to state power. In the case of Burundi, the 
Tutsi-Hima clearly gained more access to power which again intensified the 
differences between the ethnic groups.  
Even if one can say that colonialism has contributed to the ethnic-conflict, Mamdani 
(2001) asserts that blame must also be given to the post-colonial state who failed to 
promote a more inclusive vision of society- that is a society that transcends external 
concepts of race and ethnicity (Daley:2006b:12)  
The awareness of the heterogeneous origins of Burundi people leads us to a more 
nuanced picture of the persistence of the conflict and the struggles over the state. 
Rivalries between clans, communes and families absorb the social structure and cut 
across ethnic boundaries. As a result of the heterogeneous Tutsi group, its dynastic 
families and the various social bases for inter-ethnic relations, Lemarchand (1994) in 
his contributions challenge the simplistic view of social identities in the discourse 
about the conflict in Burundi. In regards to the current structure of Burundi’s post-
colonial state the Hutu and Tutsi division is only one out of many explanatory factors. 
There exists at least five specific cleavages around which conflict occurred: intra-
aristocracy, between the old guard and the young modernised elite, between Hutu and 
Tutsi, intra-Tutsi, between the military and the political elite, and more recent intra-
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Hutu ( Palipehutu -FNL).Today, there exist deep divisions within each ethnic group 
between “ hardliners” and moderates” and divides between the Burundian elite and 
the general population (educated vs uneducated, rural vs urban between employed 
and unemployed). In addition, there are other social challenges such as women still 
experiencing legal and societal discrimination, including discriminatory laws and 
credit practices and the marginalization of the minority Twa (Brachet, 
Wolpe:2005:5). 
4.4  “Watershed” events polarising the Hutu and Tutsi 
As explained above, the history of Burundi represents several examples of turbulent 
incidents of Coup d’Ètats and other political uprisings affecting the Burundi society.  
Two specific events need to be highlighted due to the influence it had on the ethnic 
polarisation between Hutu and Tutsi.  
Firstly, an aborted Hutu uprising launched at Tutsi citizens took place in 1972 
unleashing violence and killings of genocidal dimension. Some 2000-3000 Tutsi 
were killed by the Hutu rebels. In the weeks and months that followed a brutal 
repression took place coordinated by the Tutsi led Burundian army. The Tutsi 
dominated government was also involved as a result of their fear of loosing their 
political domination. In parts of the country Hutus were indiscriminately massacred. 
In other parts it was more systematic where the “intellectuals”; teachers, school 
children and any Hutus with education were murdered (Eller:1999:234,UNDP2006).  
The objective was to destroy the seeds of from which would grow up to be 
tomorrows intelligentsia. Anyone with experience from the colonial era understood 
that the existence of an intellectual elite was the prerequisite for initiative, 
independence and leadership (Mamdani:2001:230). Consequently, around 200.000 
thousand Hutu were massacred, while another 150.000 fled the country. The 
massacres that took place gave Burundi and the Great Lakes the first glimpse of a 
genocidal wave of killings (Mamdani:2001:215).   
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In the wake of the democratic election of 1993 the first Hutu newly elected President 
Melchior Ndadaye, and other Frodebu leaders were killed by amidst a failed military 
coup. Within a few hours the Tutsi had totally eliminated what a democratic 
transition had struggled to build up over the past five years (Lemarchand:1995:xiiii). 
They destroyed the hope of the Hutu population who for the first time in years saw an 
end of the ethnic discrimination and the marginalisation by the Tutsi elite. 
Ndadaye had just before his assassination explained the election of 1993 with these 
specific words; 
“After three decades of Tutsi hegemony, there finally emerged on the horizon the 
promise of a civil society free of ethnic violence, where citizenship would no longer 
be held hostage by ethnic identity”( Lemarchand:1995:xiii). 
The event of 1993 led to an incredible rage among the Hutu, especially throughout 
the country side leading to a brutal mass killing of the Tutsi population in general.  
Subsequently, the result of these two events mentioned above has brought about an 
unbridgeable moral distance between the Hutu and Tutsi (Lemarchand:1995:xiii). 
4.5 The Arusha Accord and the Burundian Peace Process 
In Burundi the peace-process began as a regional initiative which culminated in not 
only the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in August 2000 
but also the imposition one year later of a three year old transitional government 
(Bentely, Southall:2005:77).  Despite elections in June and July 2005 and the election 
to office by a Hutu President, Pierre Nkrurunziza on the 29th of August 2005, peace 
still remains fragile. This is primarily because the ceasefire agreement did not 
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successfully include all the factions of the Hutu group, the FNL-Paliphehutu15 
(Daley:2006b:15). 
 Each of the parties that were involved in the Arusha Peace agreements collectively 
agreed on the fact that ‘the conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely 
important ethnic dimensions; It stems from a struggle by the political class to accede 
and to remain in power’16  
Nineteen interests groups were represented in the Arusha negotiations, seventeen 
political parties (ten and seven of which, were Tutsi and Hutu dominated 
respectively) as well as the Government of Burundi and the National Assembly, the 
latter two comprising members from the military and from the main Tutsi Party, 
UPRONA (Daley:2006b:15) The Batwa group, whose status had never changed since 
colonial times, was not represented in Arusha, However, after the Arusha Agreement 
for the Batwa were granted two seats in the Senate and the Parliaments 
(Nindorera:2003:6-7). 
The Burundian peace process has to a large extent been elite led- between the two 
main political parties at the time UPRONA and FRODEBU- which is not uncommon 
in Africa (Bentley, Southall:2005:63). However, it should be mentioned that the 
reason why the process has been intractable might be the fact that the elite in Burundi 
has been so detached from the civil society focusing on their narrow interests 
(Bentley, Southall:2005:150).  
The unwillingness of the political elite to open up the political space is a crucial 
element in the discussions relating to participation of civil society groups in the 
conflict. Women organization’s campaigned to be included in the peace talks and 
garnered considerable international support by asking for the implementation of UN 
                                              
 
16 (Arusha Peace Agreement, Ch1, Article 4:16)  
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Security Council Resolution 1325 which call for ‘measures that support local 
women’s peace initiatives and…involve women in all of the implementation 
mechanisms of the peace agreements.(Daley:2006b:23). However in the end, the 
women organisations were only allowed to observe the ongoing negotiations.  
4.5.1 Civil society and the Peace Process 
At this stage of the thesis it is necessary to note that there exist certain basic structural 
reasons as to why civil society has been overwhelmingly excluded from the initial 
Burundian peace process.  
Firstly, one can say that the governing class is made up of politicians and soldiers, 
competing and collaborating with each other for very limited resources within an 
extremely poor state. Even though the major parties such as UPRONA and 
FRODEBU were established a long time ago their existence revolves around a 
patronage network. In a society with limited economic resources, and the state is 
central in the allocation of resources, parties tend to proliferate as ambitious 
individuals or groups creating vehicles for personal advancement. While they will 
claim promotion of particular interests, in Burundi they often rest upon the 
mobilisation of ethnic interests which is still the easiest signifier in order to gain 
support in the society (Bentley and Southall:2005:152-153). 
Secondly, civil society was largely excluded from the peace process due to the fact 
that international relations between states are often conducted on an elite level-
between politicians. In the case of Burundi, the peace agreement was a result of 
regional and international pressure upon the military government at the time to return 
back to civility (Bentley, Southall:2005:152-153). As the peace agreement was a 
regional and international interference in Burundi’s internal affairs it became more 
difficult to open up for the civil society. Too little was done to include the civil 
society as only a few symbolic civil society representatives from the women’s 
networks were present as observers of the negotiation process. 
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The Arusha Accord provided for the emplacement of a government which would 
oversee the progression of Burundi to elections and a transition to democracy. Today 
there are still increasing violations of both the constitution and the Arusha Peace 
Accords, as well as persecution of political opposition groups for their opinions 
(Forsc:2006). 
4.6 Conclusion 
The peace agreement that took place can be seen more as a step forward, however 
there is scepticism concerning its potential for bringing about a transition to 
democracy. The peace remains fragile and in order to continue on the positive path, 
various parts from the society need to be included. There is a widely expressed view 
among Burundians “that foreigners cannot and will not solve the Burundian 
problems”. In that respect it is important to view what role the local civil society can 
play in the continuing peace process in Burundi and whether the civil society actors 
can constructively contribute to a sustainable peace in the country (Bentley ands 
Southall:2005:159).  
As we have seen from this section the Peace Agreement of Arusha took place without 
the inclusion of the civil society. However, one can argue that this peace agreement 
created an “atmosphere” where the development of CSO’s could function more 
independent from the state. How did the CSO’s work prior to the Arusha peace 
process of 2000? And how has the civil society developed in Burundi since the 
election of 2005. Are these organisations capable of contributing towards a 
reconsolidating of the Hutu Tutsi communities and furthermore to a more stable 
democracy? The analysis that follows will map out a selection of the contemporary 
civil society in Burundi today, and further analyse its strength and the weaknesses. 
Finally some indications of the role CSO’s might have in the ongoing 
democratisations process will be addressed. 
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5. Civil society in Bujumbura 
5.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in chapter 4, in 1992 a public law was introduced approving the 
creation of local associations’ independence from the Burundian state. Civil society is 
not static and will evolve in conjunction with the power dimensions within a society. 
This type of evolution appears to also be the case for Burundi, where civil war raging 
the country in the 1990s, followed by the constant change of power constellations has 
hampered the nation’s civil society development.  
The civil society of Burundi remains in its infancy, yet, it is necessary to note that 
positive developments indicating the emergence of a more civilised civil society have 
begun to eventuate over the past several years. This analysis will map out a number 
of the main civil society actors in Burundi, Bujumbura and will also discuss some of 
the strengths and weaknesses of the contemporary Burundian civil society.  
Throughout the first part of this analysis I will present and discuss the selection of 
civil society actors that were investigated in the capital of Burundi, Bujumbura. 
Focusing primarily on organisations situated within the Bujumbura region is largely 
attributable to the fact that most of the organised CSO’s are located there. However, it 
is necessary to note that some of these organisations also have offices located in more 
rural areas outside the capital. 
After a thorough deliberation of the civil society actors, I will go on to discuss the 
possible constraints in regards to the nature of civil society in Burundi. These 
constraints will be examined in relation to political and financial autonomy, ethnicity 
citizenship and trust.  
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Lastly I will conclude this analysis by presenting a variety of possibilities which 
indicate the possible roles that the Burundian civil society may come to play in the 
ongoing democratisation process.  
Chapter 6 represent the second part of this analysis and here I will elaborate on the 
communitarian associations located in the rural municipality Butaganzwa north of 
Burundi. This chapter will function as a supplement to the primary analysis. It is 
intended that by dividing the analysis of this thesis into two separate chapters that we 
are able to ascertain a more comprehensive insight in the important aspect of both the 
rural and urban cleavages that exist in Burundi. In this chapter there will be a 
particular emphasis on the patron-client relationship. 
5.2 Typology of Burundian local civil society 
In this section I will present a typology of local CSO’s that I investigated within 
Bujumbura. The clear division throughout the various local CSO’s provides an 
understanding of the various vocational areas the organisations present.   
Providing insight into the various types of local CSO’s will also clarify the 
objectives, methods of work and the achievements of each of the organisations 
investigated. 
Furthermore the analysis of these CSO’s will provide an indication of the role they 
play in the Burundian society today. This is important as it will go on to provide 
pertinent information necessary for an in depth analysis of the civil society in chapter 
5 and 6. 
5.2.1 Administration of the civil society network 
With the legal approval for the construction of local CSO’s, Burundi became 
instantly affected by the creation of such an enormous number of local organisations 
each with various purposes and representing different areas of the Burundian society.  
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However, despite Burundi having experienced an inundation of various local CSO’s 
the general character was that these organisations embodied several weaknesses.  
It appeared that the organisations did not know how to organise themselves nor had 
sufficient capacity or expertise in order to create objectives that were possible to 
realise. A clear lack of horizontal cooperation existed between the various CSO’s. It 
was under the initiative to change these tendencies within the Burundian civil society, 
that FORSC (Forum for the reinforcement of the civil society) was created in 2002.17  
FORSC characterises an umbrella organisation of the civil society in Burundi 
organised around the motive of reinforcing the civil society in terms of cooperation, 
capacity, working methods and expertise. The forum does not take part in the 
activities of the organisations, but functions primarily as a coordinator for the various 
activities the members pursue. In its initial years, the forum was organised around 26 
member organisations. Today it has a membership of more than 104 organisations. 18
In the initial period FORSC had three main objectives. The first was to facilitate 
collaboration between CSO’s, making them consult with one another on various 
topics. The reason behind this objective was to strengthen the capacity of the civil 
society in general, as cooperation between organisations was viewed as making them 
more visible, thereby enforcing their possibility to influence the people and put 
pressure on the government. Secondly, FORSC made a permanent diagnostic of the 
social, economic, political and security situation of the country. In 2002 Burundi was 
still in a state of war resulting in many CSO’s differing in their views around the 
nation’s security situation. As a result one of FORSC’s main objectives was to gather 
people within the civil society and to create a collective vision (consensus) as far as 
possible regarding the political problems and security issues Burundi was facing. 
                                              
17 Interview: Gordien Baranyanka and Emmanuel Nshimirimana 
18 Interview: Gordien Baranyanka 
 66 
This would enable the CSO’s to create common goals that people can gather around 
and collectively work towards.19
In order to improve the collaboration among the CSO’s, FORSC created a website, 
and organised radio broadcasts enabling CSO’s to express their arguments and 
exchange information regarding their areas of expertise. Due to these broadcasts my 
informant in FORSC, stated that the collaboration and exchange of information 
between the organisations have notably improved over the last couple of years. 
 Once every trimester FORSC organise seminars where civil society actors, members 
and non -members and other personnel of expertise such as lawyers, economists and 
scientists come together and perform a socio-political and economic analyses of 
Burundi. The recommendations and results are written in a document representing the 
consensus of the civil society. The result and recommendations are further sent to the 
government in order to put pressure for change on specific areas such as human rights 
violations, corruption.20
Over the last year FORSC has also established a regional initiative in order to 
improve the civil society activities in the rural areas. As will be presented in the 
second part of this analysis, the collaboration between CSO’s in the urban areas of 
Bujumbura and the communitarian associations in the rural areas are weak. In order 
to improve the cooperation, a network has been created where one representative is 
sent out to the sixteen rural provinces, addressing the governor about the political 
wishes of the rural population in the specific province. This might serve two 
purposes, firstly, the rural population are provided with a person who can speak their 
case. Secondly, through the use of representatives, urban civil society is able to 
become more aware of the actual work which these communitarian associations are 
                                              
19 Interview: Ibid 
20 Interview: Gordien Baranyanka. 
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providing facilitating future collaboration between the urban CSO’s and the rural 
communitarian associations.21
Despite the positive tendencies mentioned in this section towards enhancing the 
horizontal cooperation between the CSO’s, only five of the organisations which will 
be elaborated upon in this thesis are official members of FORSC. These were: 
Dushirehamwe, Biraturaba, ITEKA, OAG and COSOME. COSOME was founded by 
the FORSC in 2005. 22
The scarcity of membership within FORSC confirms that there still exists a lack of 
horizontal collaboration within the Burundian civil society. This indicated a clear 
weakness in regards to the overall influence of FORSC.  
However, what is really hampering the efficiency and influence of FORSC is the fact 
that the government is seeking to undermine the creation of such networks in 
Burundi. The government has yet to officially recognize FORSC as an organisation, 
and there are indications that it opposes the enforcement of such a network in fear of 
the impact this network might have in rendering the civil society stronger.23 If the 
CSO’s collaborate together more tightly, it is clear that it will become more difficult 
for the government to manipulate or to take control over their work. It will increase 
the political autonomy of the civil society. This in turn will give more strength to the 
civil society obtaining a stronger influence on the state. Nevertheless, FORSC 
continues to actively lobby state officials in order to become officially 
approved.24Despite its weaknesses, my informant at FORSC, Gordien Baranyanka, 
states that the creation of this network organisation has made them less vulnerable 
with regards to the political pressure from the state.  
                                              
21 Interview: ibid. 
22 Interview: Gordien Baranyanka, Melchior, Ndayishimiye, Christine ,Miturumbwe, Emmanuel    Nshimirimana. 
23  Interview: Gordien Baranyanka. 
24  Interview: Ibid. 
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5.2.2 Organisations that promote and defend human rights, justice 
and equal citizenship. 
This category represents organisations that in one way or another defend the human 
rights of different groups within the Burundian society. The violations of human 
rights have been severe throughout Burundian history and despite the democratic 
election of 2005, the government has not managed to bring about a society free of 
human rights violations. The human rights situation is unstable due to the lack of 
capacity of rights-holders and duty-bearers. There is widespread poverty, and few 
enjoy the full range of economic and social rights (United Nations:2008).    
The CSO’s representing this category are many and vary in terms of capacity and 
strength. However, the four represented here are all well recognised in Bujumbura. 
The most established one of these three- Ligue ITEKA, Burundian Human Rights 
League (ITEKA), has the capacity to focus on the promotion of human rights on a 
larger scale than the other organisations. Hence, ITEKA actively defends and 
promotes human rights and justice related to different areas such as civil rights, 
political rights, social rights and economical rights. 
The other three organisations while advocating human rights, they do so on a much 
smaller scale. Activities include the promoting of the rights of a specific vulnerable 
group of people, such as prisoners, namely Association for the Promotion of the 
Human Rights and of the prisoners, APRODH and Burundian Association for the 
defence and the promotion of the rights of the prisoners, ABDP. The fourth 
organisation Biraturaba a Kirundi word, which means ‘that concerns us’, works to 
improve the rights and living conditions of the most vulnerable and marginalized 
group within the Burundian society, namely the Batwa.   
ITEKA is the oldest and most established CSO in Burundi born under a period of 
democratic liberalisation in 1991. It is founded on the main objective to protect and 
promote Human Rights throughout Burundi. In order to achieve their goal, ITEKA 
has placed human rights observers around the country, who document individual 
cases of killings, executions and other types of abuses. The organisations also direct, 
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assist and advise a number of people in cases of “disappearance”, arbitrary detentions 
and legal proceedings. On average 500-600 cases are investigated annually.25
One part of ITEKA’s program is to assist detainees. As part of this work ITEKA has 
agreements with more than twenty five lawyers to represent cases of individuals 
before the Burundian criminal courts and other jurisdictions. In order to transport 
witnesses to court hearings ITEKA collaborates with APRODH and ABDP in order 
to increase its efficiency. The transportation of witnesses is important in a country as 
Burundi where the lack of infrastructure makes in difficult for the prisoners living in 
rural areas to come to Bujumbura. The transportation of detainees also increases the 
efficiency of the legal procedure and ensures that the right of both victims and 
defendants are respected by the court. 26
Lobbying is one of the most crucial elements of the ITEKA’s work. The organisation 
chairs the Observatory on Governmental Action (OAG), which is an organisation that 
will be presented more in depth below.27 ITEKA has specifically had the role, 
especially during the peace negotiations, of drawing public, governmental and 
international attention, through press releases and public statements on the various 
human rights issues at the time. This work has continued and today ITEKA lobby the 
government in order to improve the rights of all citizens and to secure the country 
better against human rights violations28
ITEKA uses many resources on human rights promotional work in order to improve 
the foundation for respect of human rights in Burundi. It actively works with the local 
radio, namely Radio Isanganiro and Radio Publique Africain (RPA), in order to 
render its message more visible.29 It has informative broadcasts talking about the 
                                              
25 Interview:  Chantal, Niyokindi 
26 Ibid 
27 Interview:  Chantal, Niyokindi and Melchior, Ndayishimiye 
28 Interview: Chantal Niyokindi 
29 Interview: Dr. Chantal Niyokindi, Mathias Manirakiza and Emmanuel Nsabimana:  
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importance of respecting human rights and the actual abuses of human rights taking 
place in Burundi. In collaboration with Radio Isanganiro ITEKA stages a weekly 
discussion broadcast every Sunday morning called Kunama - “meeting place”- where 
a debate on the importance of human rights with respect to developing democracy in 
Burundi takes place. In these broadcasts ITEKA often take contributions from the 
population who can ask questions related to human rights abuses. An annual rapport 
is published by ITEKA regarding the evolution of the Human Rights situation 
throughout Burundi.30Some of my informants highlighted that the civil society in 
Bujumbura is characterised as most influential in the area of human rights.31
APRODH and ABDP work on a smaller scale than ITEKA, promoting human rights 
especially related to prisoners. ABDP was founded in 1995, however due to 
intensified conflict throughout Burundi during this period, the organisation fully 
began its work in 1997.32
ABDP and APRODH each share the same core objectives. That is to defend and 
advance the human and legal rights of Burundi’s detainees and prisoners. The leader 
of APRODH, Jean Claver was originally the founder of ABDP. However, due to 
economical embezzlements, he decided to leave the organisation and start APRODH 
in 2001.  
From my observations while the objectives of these two organisations are very 
similar, they ensure that their work does not overlap. Both of these organisations 
activities are firmly rooted in practical measures- to improve the conditions in the 
prisons of Burundi. The mid 1990’s was especially a period where the government 
                                              
30 Dr. Chantal Niyokindi and www.ligue-iteka.bi: . 
31 Interview:Emmanuel Nshimirimana: 
32 Interview: Laurent Gahungu : 
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used prisons to exert their authority. As a consequence, torture and execution of 
prisoners was an everyday occurrence. 33
One of the objectives of ABDP is to ensure that the authorities respect the norms of 
the legal process. As most detainees in Burundi lack the means to defend themselves 
effectively, ABDP, in collaboration with a number of Burundian lawyers has 
established a legal assistance program for detainees.(Amnesty International:2001). 
APRODH has taken a similar role aimed specifically at victims of sexual violence 
due to sexual violence becoming an increasing problem towards the end of the 
1990’s.  
In addition, medical assistance programs aimed at detainees and victims of sexual 
violence and torture are conducted by these two organisations. In terms of the 
detainees, this is done in order to combat deficiencies that often leave prisoners 
vulnerable to illness and disease. 
Further to the above mentioned roles of these two organisations, both ABDP and 
APRODH perform an educative role in prisons. This is because the majority of 
juveniles have no access to formal training. ABDP has been active in arranging 
training in areas such as agriculture, mechanics and carpentry, while APRODH focus 
more on educating the police and prison guards of the rules and laws that exist. This 
is to prevent incidents of violence with the prisoners.  
Both ABDP and APROD work actively against torture. ABDP was the fist 
organisation to make public statements against tortures in 1998.34 Both of the 
organisations document cases of torture and intervene regularly to protect people at 
risk of torture. My informant in ABDP state that the campaigns against torture have 
proven successful and that the government has followed some recommendations that 
both these organisations have made.  
                                              
33 Interview: Laurent Gahungu and Pierre Claver Mbonimpa 
34 Interview: Laurent Gahungu : 
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Over the past several years, the conditions in Burundi’s central prisons have 
improved significantly thanks in part to the work of ABDP and APRODH. Whereas 
ABDP had an influential role prior to the economic embezzlements that took place, 
this incident has put the organisation in economical difficulties. Several of my 
informant highlighted that today APRODH is more influential and efficient in 
protecting the rights of prisoners than ABDP.35
As mentioned earlier, Batwas have always been a marginalized group within the 
Burundian society and also within the political discourse. The problems affecting the 
Batwa are quite similar throughout the country. In Burundi, land is a source of power, 
and the subordinate identity of Batwa can to a certain extent be explained by their 
lack of land, as the majority live on the land of others. In addition, only a marginal 
percentage of Batwa are educated.  Most Batwa today have been forced from their 
hunter-gatherer existence in order to work as casual labourers on other people’s land. 
They are powerless and poor, and discriminated against because they are an ethnic 
minority (Integrated Regional Information Networks: 2008). 
BIRATURABA was created in 2002 primarily aimed towards promoting the rights of 
the marginalized population of the Batwa. BIRATURABA’s primary aim is to reduce 
and prevent ignorance and indifference towards the Batwa within the population of 
Burundi.36  
BIRATURABA’s strategy is to operate in one specific area at the time so that the 
achievements will be more visible. The primary objective for BIRATURABA is to 
provide the Batwa people with their own land. As the Batwa have no land, they are 
constantly forced to move, making it impossible for the children to start school and 
hence gain a sufficient education.37 For one of BIRATURABA’s projects they work 
                                              
35 Interview: Emmanuel Nshimirimana, Paulin Murhimanya, Alexis, Nsahimana  
36 Interview: Emmanuel Nshimirimana 
37Melchior, Dayishimiye 
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towards the local administration, as most of the Batwas are located in rural local 
communities. Through the local administration they find areas where they can build 
houses, and with a small funding from an Italian NGO they have managed to 
construct 50 houses. BIRATURABA offers the expertise needed, but it is the Batwa 
themselves who are in charge of the construction. In addition, BIRATURABA helps 
the Batwa children to be enrolled into primary school and in various provinces and 
they have succeeded to register 140 children into primary school. 
When evaluating their project, BIRATURABA has observed that the Batwa in the 
commune are now less marginalized. The Batwa themselves have expressed that they 
are more respected both by the local population and also by the administration. 38
5.2.3 Governmental surveillance and fights against corruption.  
The organisations representing this category aim at observing and critically analysing 
the governmental action on a range of political areas. In order to achieve these goals, 
three different organisations are presented in this category- each of which encompass 
different strategies, hold different degrees of capacity and therefore represent 
different roles within the civil society. The first organisation that will be presented- 
the OAG- can be seen as the most established of the three, due to it having more 
experience and expertise to date within this specific area in addition to it employing 
more staff than the other two organisations of focus. 
OAG is a network organisations made up of eighteen different associations, six 
journalists and six parliamentarians. The primary objective of this organisation is to 
conduct research, analysis and advocacy on Burundian government policy and 
practise in order to raise public awareness and increase government accountability.39 
Established in 2001 its first main activity was to observe the Arusha Peace 
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negotiations. Following the elections of 2005, OAG conducted a major study, namely 
an analysis of the Burundi governments first year in power which later has been 
referred to in both local and international analysis of the region. The overall mission 
of OAG is to hold leaders more accountable for the actions they undertake that affect 
the people of Burundi particularly where human rights appear to have been ignored 
or overseen. 40
Within the civil society, OAG holds an important role as it is one of the few 
organisations within Burundi able to provide critical analysis and profound research 
on various political issues affecting the nation. It conducts surveys, opinion polls and 
studies about the implementations of the Government’s commitments as well as 
undertaking contextual analysis aimed at understanding the country’s political 
development. The OAG plays a highly active role, they organise regular workshops 
and conferences that provide an account of positive and negative impacts of the 
Government’s “achievements”. 41
Numerous publications have been created. Among the most influential publications in 
terms of governmental assessment accomplished include survey and publications 
concerning the Burundian Electoral System, Assessment of the implementation of the 
Arusha Accord and Repatriation and Land Property Management.42 One can argue 
that these reports serve as important research material if policies of development in 
these areas should be carried out. 
While the OAG clearly play an influential role in improving human rights and the 
civil society in Burundi, a survey conducted in 2007 by members of the OAG states 
that the organisation was not well known outside the urban areas of Burundi. As a 
result from the survey’s findings the OAG has since realised the importance of using 
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41 Interview: Alexis, Nsahimana and Melchior Ndayishimiye 
42 www.oag.bi and Interview: Melchior Ndayishimiye 
 75
radio as a further primary medium in order to get their message across to the rural 
provinces, which is almost the only method for the rural population to be informed of 
its presence and role.43
Lobbying and advocacy towards the government is also an important part of OAG’s 
agenda in attempting to influence changes in government policies and decision-
making. Several of my informants emphasised the important role of OAG in that 
respect.44 An example of OAG’s achievements was the objection against the former 
Minister of Information and Communication. The organisation contested against the 
Minister’s constant manipulation against the media and the press. As a consequence 
of OAG’s pressure on the government, the president Pierre Nkurunziza decided to 
remove the minister and have him replaced.     
COSOME comprising 13 member organisations was established in 2005 by FORSC 
for the purpose of monitoring and observing the democratic election process.  
 Elections in Burundi are often associated with massacres and Coup d’Ètats. Both the 
elections of 1972 and 1993 led to violent conflict between the two main ethnic groups 
(Eller:1999). Consequently there was a crucial need for an organisation such as 
COSOME to observe the electoral campaign of the political parties involved and 
further explain to the people what this meant in practical terms. As the education 
level in Burundi is limited, there was a need for an organisation who could explain to 
the nation’s citizens- in familiar terms- what the various political party programs and 
agendas entail in reality.  
Throughout the early days of COSOME its role was primarily to inform the people 
about the democratic process. In collaboration with the media it observed the 
electoral process to ensure that actions by political parties were untaken under the 
correct process. They placed observers throughout the region in every province that 
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provided reports back to the organisation’s head quarter in Bujumbura. After the 
elections a report was made public.  
After the 2005 election, COSOME has gone on to also adopt the role as “civic 
educators” through a special education program. Through this program COSOME 
staff train teachers in various provinces about the democratic and electoral process. 
Furthermore these teachers travel throughout the different municipalities within each 
of the provinces and educate the citizens about democratic values and democracy in 
general. This year they have educated around 2500 teachers who work throughout the 
entire country.  
In addition to the educative program, COSOME has also started to prepare for the 
next election of 2010. Whereas COSOME earlier had a special focus on specific 
groups within the Burundian society, their strategy has shifted towards the population 
as a whole. At present COSOME are producing a video about the electoral process as 
well as addressing the potential questions that might be related to this process.  
Lobbying is also an important aspect of COSOME’s work. Several members of the 
organisation exercise lobbying with Members of Parliament regarding governmental 
policies. Currently, COSOME is in the process of influencing the “common” law. 
Based on research within this area the organisation provides the government with 
proposals to include in any new legislation and laws being passed. They put pressure 
on the government to amend the laws regarding how politicians should behave to 
ensure they are held accountable for their actions including their adherence to human 
rights and the electoral process. COSOME also pressures the government to alter 
current policy on how the police should perform their tasks and civil responsibilities. 
As COSOME undertakes this lobbying in an active and visible manner throughout 
the country which has resulted in the government having undertaken on occasion 
policy changes as a result of the organisation’s influence.   
Corruption is a highly problematic issue in Burundi which affects the lowest classes 
of society. Burundi was ranked 130 out of 163 countries surveyed in the 
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Transparency International 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index (Freedom 
House:2007:3). 
As Burundi also is ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world, it is clear that 
the widespread corruption impede the development of the Burundian society. 
The CSO -the Observatory for the struggle against corruption- OLUCOME, works 
specifically around the issues of corruption and economic fraud. The organisation 
puts pressure on the state regarding these critical areas.  
OLUCOME is one of the few CSO’s operating in Burundi without foreign funding. 
As a result its capacity in terms of resources and hiring permanent staff is limited. 
The organisation comprised of 5 permanent staff consists but it also has access to 
over 400 members who work voluntarily for the organisation and help to raise 
funding for OLUCOME’s work.  
Despite these limitations, many of my informants from other CSO’s highlighted the 
important role of OLUCOME noting it successful in its ability to actively put 
pressure and criticize the state, regarding issues of corruption and economic 
embezzlement. OLUCOME regularly criticizes the government of its failure to arrest 
people who are responsible for such crimes. The organization has at least reported 
more than 1500 instances of corruption amounting to approximately 100 million US 
dollars during the last 12 years.45  
A key factor driving corruption in Burundi is due to the fact that some of the 
government revenues and expenditures have not been regularly listed on the budget. 
In 2006, the finance minister allegedly performed an improper sale of the presidential 
plane “Falcon 50”. OLUCOME criticized the speed at which the sale was made, and 
complained that the government did not accept the highest bid loosing $2 million 
dollars in the process. Even though this was a known fact among the civil society 
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actors, none of them expressed this publicly except OLUCOME. Shortly after 
OLUCOME denounced this fact, the President Pierre Nkurunziza demoted his 
finance minister. This serves as an example of the fact that their “message” is heard 
(Amnesty International:2006)46
However, slightly after OLUCOME publicly exposed this information my informant, 
Gabriel Rufyiri was arrested on the charge of defamation. In addition several 
members of the OLUCOME have been threatened on their life, supposedly by people 
working for the government. A key indicator that corruption is still very present 
within the current government and that the work of these organizations still has had a 
small affect in achieving an improved civil society. The examples above are clearly 
barriers which have affected the intended functioning of organization such as 
OLUCOME. However, informant Gabriel Rufyiri was clear when he stated that 
‘everyone who wishes to realize something for the better of a whole population must 
agree to put his life at risk’. Since this incident of 2006, the organization continues its 
work in the same way, and addresses the international community, such as Amnesty 
International if threats are made from the government. 
 
5.2.4 Organisations for the promotion of the freedom of speech 
(media) 
Development and democratisation depend on a well-functioning media. In many 
African countries, media has been an integrated part of the government’s machinery 
of repression. However, media can also play an important role in pushing forward 
democratic ideas and movements. Nevertheless, the media in Africa rarely constitute 
a tool which can positively contribute to the strengthening of civil society due to the 
heavy control exercised by the state (Makumbe:1998:312).  
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Regarding the media in Burundi, a particular potential form of media to inform 
citizens is the role of the radio. Due to Burundi’s limited literacy rate, radio occupies 
a role as an important source of information. This is because the written press is 
almost non-existent, and the only newspaper that comes out every day is nationally 
run. There exists both private and nationally run radios in Burundi but these have 
been largely affected by a high level of state censorship.   
The development of an independent media is a fairly recent phenomenon in Burundi. 
Prior to the elections of 2005, the existing private radios did not actively promote the 
civil society. In general the media was prior to 2005 solely made up of either private 
or national radio stations primarily serving the purpose of the state. Recently, 
however, one can argue that the role of the media in Burundi has changed with the 
foundation of the independent private radios namely Radio Isanganiro and RPA 
both established in the wake of the democratic election of 2005.  
As they were established in a period where Burundi was negotiating for peace the 
objectives were largely associated to peace and democratisation. The role of the radio 
in the initial period of existence was to put pressure on the government so that all 
groups were included in the negotiation process, including the rebel party FNL-
PALIPEHUTU47.  
As a consequence, conflict took form between the independent private radio stations 
and the government. The government assumed that the radio stations worked for the 
rebels. In the end, the radio stations managed to convince the government to a certain 
degree that listening to the various opinions was necessary in order to obtain peace. 
One can argue that media played a key role in the election of 2005 by monitoring the 
electoral process, and informing the population in both rural and urban areas about 
irregularities and insecurity that caused elections to be postponed in some regions. 
Their objective was to make sure that the general population understood what the 
                                              
47  In 2001, the FNL split into two factions, one of the factions remain outside the peace agreement and 
continue to terrorise the civilian population (Bentley Southall:2005:84) 
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election meant for the country in practical terms. In addition, these two radios 
performed an observatory role making sure that the election was conducted in a 
“transparent” manner as far as this was possible. 
Today, the role of Radio Isanganiro and RPA, are first and foremost room for 
dialogue where conflicting parts within the Burundian society can express their 
arguments. One can argue that these radio stations constitute a significant role within 
the civil society in Burundi as they operate fairly independent from the state, in 
addition to promoting the ideas and thoughts of CSO’s. 
No one is excluded from radio broadcasts debates between civil society groups, 
government deputies and members of the rebel group take part in discussions 
concerning various topics of conflict. Hence, one can argue that these radio channels 
take part in setting the political agenda. Many relevant questions regarding issues 
such as corruption and human rights violations are brought up in the light. Even 
though the radio stations have antennas in the various provinces of the Burundian 
state it still seems like the urban population has more access to the information they 
provide. 
Seen in a comparative perspective, the role of the private radio’s in Burundi differ 
from private radio channels in other parts of the region. In Tanzania for instance the 
private radio channels that exist still work generally for the ministers and in Rwanda 
private radios are strictly forbidden as the freedom of speech is almost non existent. 
This is a quite common phenomenon in many parts of Africa where even though the 
radio is supposedly “private” it is still affected by a heavy self censorship from the 
state. Even though the government in Burundi makes attempts to influence the radio 
or limit the scope of work and broadcast undertaken it has been made clear that this 
does not heavily affect their ongoing strategic planning of their work. Radio 
Isanganiro and RPA continue to address controversial questions, often criticising the 
government for its work. 
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The private radio stations are the main source- and often the only source of objective 
information in Burundi both in the rural and in the urban areas. This is namely due to 
the fact that 40.7 percent of the population above 15 years old are illiterate (Human 
Development Report:2007). Consequently, the radio is the only source of information 
for these people. Among a population where 37.6 percent live under the poverty line, 
most of whom are situated in the rural areas of the country, radio is the only medium 
to which most people have access to on a regular basis. Radio Isanganiro and RPA 
ensure that information is provided in all the languages that are spoken in Burundi, 
Kirundi, Swahili and French. Radio Isanganiro are also able to broadcast in Congo, 
Rwanda and Tanzania. This serves an important political purpose as many Burundian 
have fled the country during times of war. Through these broadcast refugees in other 
countries can get updated on the political situation in Burundi.48   
The majority of my informants within the CSO’s highlighted the importance of 
having private independent radio stations, so that their message and their work could 
be made more visible for the public. 49
Based on this one can argue that the media contributes to strengthen the civil society 
as it renders their action more visible increasing its influence and affect towards the 
state.  In addition the developments of independent radios facilitate the cooperation of 
various civil society groups. 
5.2.5 Organisation for the promotion of gender equality in the 
peace-process 
Mainly two network organisations are the main contributors in promoting the role of 
women and gender equality in Burundi today. These are the Collective of the Female 
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Organizations and NGO’s of Burundi, CAFOB and Dushirehamwe, an organisation 
which aims for peaceful cohabitation through the reinforcement of female leadership.  
CAFOB can be characterised as the main and largest collective of women 
associations in Burundi comprised of 52 CSO’s, with more than 30.000 members. 
CAFOB is also known for having the leading administrative role of these women 
organisations50 and was officially created in 1997, in a difficult time of war. As the 
early peace negotiations of Arusha were taking place, CAFOB progressively became 
the “voice” of the women of Burundi. Madame Goretti Nduwayo, currently working 
for the UNIFEM emphasise that during this period, the government consulted 
CAFOB on issues regarding women in particular (Report CAFOB:2007).   
Today these two network organisations are comprising 300 women organisation 
cooperating with each other in various domains. It has been estimated that the women 
network reaches out to more than 7000 women at the community level. As a result 
they have gained increasing national recognition over the last couple of years. 
(InternationalAlert:2006:1). 
 
 
 
 
Statistics of member organizations since 1994.51
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CAFOB attempts to improve the capacity of the 52 comprising member 
organisations. In addition they function as a collective contributing to the 
amelioration of life and improvement of the socio-economic and legal rights of 
women in Burundi. 
Dushirehamwe, a Kirundi word for ‘lets reconcile’ was established in 1996 as a 
network organisation of individuals engaged in training program of trainers in gender 
and conflict prevention, management and peace-building approaches in collaboration 
with International Alert and UNIFEM.  In 2002, it became an independent CSO with 
a primary focus on peace-building (International Alert:2006).  
One of Dushirehamwe’s main activities involves creating local initiatives for women. 
Dushirehamwe’s work is conducted throughout thirteen provinces (out of 17). 158 
trainers are present and 390 leaders at the community level are involved with peace 
education, community reconciliation, early warning activities and raising the 
awareness of women’s rights in relation to gender-based violence. My informants 
could prove that this program had involved over 9000 people in one year.52
One of Dushirehamwe’s and CAFOB’s main priorities over the recent time has been 
to put pressure on the government to include women in the decision making 
positions. Both network organisations were active in lobbying for women 
participation in the democratic election of 2005. Together with the coalition of 
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women organisations Dushirehamwe was a key facilitator in ensuring that Burundi’s 
new constitution was gender sensitive. In addition they took part in analysing the 
draft constitution and electoral code from a gender perspective. 
CAFOB specifically played an important role in getting women issues included in the 
Arusha peace negotiations. As a result, women now represent 30% of staff employed 
within the Burundi government. In reality, however, despite their increased presence 
of government roles the formal representation of women is not fully respected 
(Internatational Alert:2006).53
Today, these two women organisations collectively work together in order to make 
gender violence a major political issue in Burundi and to address the lack of 
governmental action. They actively try to give out information to women about their 
rights and raise the awareness of the sexual violence taking place in Burundi today.   
CAFOB works with families in order to change the mentality of men, women and 
children. They teach them about equality and how to change the traditional patterns 
of inequality that still exist between Burundian women and men today. Out of the 
40.4 percent of the Burundian citizens who are illiterate, 77.6 percent of these are 
women (Human Development Report:2007). This poses difficulties for the women 
organisations when proving information about their work. This is because it is 
particularly difficult to reach out to the mass population through personal meetings. 
This is why education among women is crucial in order to enhance development in 
Burundi.54
Dushirehamwe has as one of their important activities, to assist the repatriation and 
reintegration of refugees and displaced people. As thousands of refugees and 
internally displaced people that left during the war are returning to Burundi, there are 
inevitable tensions over land claims and other issues. As Dushirehamwe, is one of the 
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organisations that actually is stationed in most parts of the country, it is able to 
constructively work closely with communities to ensure that refugees are not rejected.  
Dushirehamwe train women on their rights and responsibilities and on political 
participation. It enables better linkages to be created between women at the grass root 
level and women decision makers, for instance women in government through 
regular exchange meetings.   
While the two organisations have similar objectives, their role and practical function 
in the field is quite different. CAFOB’s work mainly comprises of improving the 
capacity of the member organisations together with pressuring the state on various 
issues concerning gender. Dushirehamwe on the other hand works actively in the 
field, especially targeted at women in rural areas.55
5.3 Conclusion 
In this section I have discussed the urban CSO’s of enquiry. This was undertaken in 
order to present the role and function of each of these organisations within the 
Burundian society. By presenting their objectives and some of their results, one is 
able to gain a better understanding and comprehension of the role they play within 
the civil society.  
From the typology above, one can argue that there has been a positive development 
within the CSO’s since the public law of 1992, which allowed for these organisations 
to emerge. While the above mentioned civil society actors- are distinctly different 
they all play an important roles within the Burundian society. Several of these 
organisations have demonstrated the power and capacity to confront the government, 
while other display powers in being able to enhance the human rights of Burundian 
citizens. In certain aspects the CSO’s operating within Burundi appear to have 
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replaced the role of the state. While it is clear that the organisations of focus in this 
thesis hold an important function within the Burundian society, it is important to 
highlight that they are also inhibited by certain issues preventing them from operating 
to their optimal levels. Throughout chapter three I have outlined the constraints 
linked to political and financial autonomy, ethnic cleavages, construction of 
citizenship and patron client relationships. The way in which these particular 
constraints have the power and capacity to influence civil society and its relation to 
democratisation will be discussed below. 
5.4 Autonomy 
5.4.1 Political autonomy 
As mentioned in chapter 3, a central argument to the civil society from a neo- liberal 
perspective, is the concern with autonomy of associational life vis a vis the state. 
Subsequently, the investigation and analysis of the degree of autonomy and the 
development of autonomy will be the principle focus of the following section. In the 
section below I will discuss the constraints related to lack of political autonomy in 
Burundi urban civil society. 
Scholars supporting the neo-liberal view of civil society, argue that civil society in an 
African context cannot provide any significant contribution towards democratisation 
due to the lack of autonomy of the civil society actors.  Political autonomy from the 
state and foreign donors are both seen as desirable features of CSO’s. However, in an 
African context, this is rarely the case. Experience demonstrates that the state often 
seeks to inhibit the scope for effective independent action through political 
interference, co-option and restrictive legislation. White (1994) acknowledges that 
the boundaries between the state and civil society are blurry in practice and that the 
autonomy of civil society is variable. Yet he considers autonomy to be part of the 
attributes of civil society as an “ideal type concept”(Beckman:2001b:53). This 
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coincides with my observation from the CSO’s situated in Bujumbura. The autonomy 
of the CSO’s varied- often significantly. 
Several of my informants argued that the CSO’s demonstrate an increased political 
autonomy than that prior to the Peace Agreement in 2000. Consequently, one can 
argue that the development of the civil society in conjunction with the nation’s 
political development has enhanced both peace and stability within the state of 
Burundi.  
According to Diamond, if civil society actors can operate as viable and effective, they 
need to be autonomous and well endowed with the right kind of resources. However, 
a minority of civil society actors in Africa are able to function without the support of 
international NGO’s or support from the state. A characteristic of many civil society 
actors in Africa is the fact that they often are overpowered by the control and 
command of the state and are therefore often seen as mere “promoters” of the state 
(Makumbe:1998:312) rather than playing a more influential and substantive role in 
the improvement of civil society.  
The Burundian CSO’s analysed in the first part of this section, all depend on foreign 
funding in order to function. With regards to the state, the civil society actors are 
officially independent and there is no financial support to the CSO’s from the state. It 
is important to distinguish between distance and autonomy – organisations may 
sympathise with a political actor, and thus enjoy closeness to it and consequent 
influence, but remain autonomous because they continue to set their own priorities. It 
is difficult to observe the difference between being autonomous and having a 
relationship towards the political actor even though they operate as autonomous from 
the state.  
However, some of my informants emphasised this aspect in relation to LITEKA 
which was an organisation created by representatives from the FRODEBU party, the 
main Hutu party. Especially during the critical years of war, LITEKA was accused 
for having close ties with the political party FRODEBU. On the one hand such close 
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ties to a political party, representing in majority the role of the Hutus can possibly 
weaken the role of a civil society when in principle their primary objective is to serve 
the overall good for all citizens. Under the civil war, this might have been of concern 
as people were closely tied up to ethnicity and therefore highly representing their 
ethnic group. However, since the peace agreement, the political parties that were once 
linked to either Hutu or Tutsi, have made attempts to change this perception by 
allowing all ethnic groups to be included in the parties. Therefore, on the other hand, 
ties held to one of the main political parties give LITEKA an increased influence vis 
a vis the state on certain issues they wish to pursue, enhancing the capacity of the 
civil society.  As a consequence of the ethnic war, LITEKA is today more conscious 
about their political strategies and has tried to adapt their policies so that they are not 
accused for only supporting the Hutu population.56
Several of my informants placed emphasis on the fact that the CSO’s in Burundi have 
been notably affected by heavy governmental censorship. The initial period of the 
emergence of CSO’s during the early 1990’s up until 2000 civil society had little 
autonomy due to the fact that the Burundian government actively manipulated and 
influenced the work of any CSO’s working within Burundi.57  Despite the level of 
heavy manipulation, control and influence exerted by the government to which civil 
society was subject, it can be argued that Burundi has undergone a positive 
development since the end of the Arusha Peace Agreement in 2000. In the urban 
areas political censorship has significantly reduced over the recent years.  
Bratton (1994:3) argues that in order for CSO’s to be politically active, the citizens 
need to be able to communicate with one another and debate the governmental 
situation. State owned media is not conducive to civil society, and civil society is 
always stronger where there is a diversity of media outlets and political views. 
Resultantly, the positive development with regards to political autonomy can be 
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illustrated through the role of the media in the Burundian context. As mentioned 
earlier, prior to the peace-agreement both the private and state owned radios were 
heavily censored by the state. The state owned radios were- and still are- legitimized 
promoters of the state. The voice and influence of state owned broadcasters 
subsequently inhibited the views and voices of CSO’s and preventing them from 
being able to extent their voice throughout the larger public. As mentioned in the 
typology of the media, radio functions as the most important way of reaching out to a 
highly illiterate Burundian public.  
Since the election of 2005, privately owned radio broadcasters have undergone a 
positive development in terms of their political autonomy from the state. My 
informant in Radio Isanganiro underlined this fact when he emphasised that their 
staff were strictly prohibited of any political relation to the existing parties of 
politics.58 Within Radio Isanganiro, there have been incidents when journalists who 
have been members of political parties have been replaced due to their political 
allegiances. The radios of enquiry, RPA and Isanganiro both hold a high degree of 
independence from the state. This independence is demonstrated through the 
broadcasts that they have, where they challenge the state on various sensitive issues 
regarding corruption and human rights violations. As mentioned earlier, both RPA 
and Isanganiro collaborate with the civil society actors and address the government 
on various issues of concern. The government is starting to realize the level of 
influence that radio has on the general population. As a result, Members of 
Parliament (MP’s) are beginning to participate in on-air discussions regarding various 
political issues. My informants at the private radio broadcasters underline that there 
are still confrontations between the government and the media, however the 
government is realising that it is not always in their best interests to appear to be 
constantly opposing the media.59  
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RPA and Radio Isanganiro enhance the capacity of the civil society on a general 
level. They actively ensure that their work and objectives display a high level of 
transparency and are highly visible to the people and the state. My informants in both 
the private radio stations of enquiry highlight their degree of independency from the 
state compared to other private radio stations in the region. As mentioned earlier, in 
Rwanda, there exists no liberty of expression at all as the civil society is entirely 
influenced and controlled by the government(Uvin,Unsworth:2002:5). Evidence of 
this was brought to light by my informant in RPA who attended a meeting in Rwanda 
in December 2007. During my informant’s identity check the Rwandan police 
noticed that he was a journalist. The police asked what type of organisation my 
informant worked for. Upon telling the police he worked for private radio broadcaster 
RPA, they replied “oh you work for a radio station that confronts the government- it 
would never take place in this country”60  
 There are however tendencies that demonstrate the instability of the political 
independence of the Burundian CSO’s in relation to the state. In the wake of the 
election that took place in 2005, tension arose between the CSO’s and the Burundian 
government. The government had wanted to restrict the civil society and their 
influence. Accordingly, by means of the political and economic manipulation the 
government attempted to influence the Burundian population into believe that 
journalists worked for the “white”. The government demanded that people should 
stop listening to the radio claiming that the journalists were liars who were not to be 
believed. In 2006 several journalists, one of whom was the director of Radio 
Isanganiro, Mathias Manirakiza was sent to jail allegedly for political reasons while 
in reality he was merely voicing his concern regarding the nations’ civil liberties. 
During this period, RPA and Radio Isanganiro had questioned the truth of the 
government’s accusation against the opposition planning a Coup d’Ètat. The private 
radios claimed that the accusations appeared to be an excuse from the government to 
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attenuate the opposition and the private media. As a subsequence of this government 
track down three journalists from the private media were imprisoned (Committee to 
Protect Journalists:2006). 
According to my informants within the media sector it was the work of the civil 
society private radio broadcasters that convinced the people to realize that what was 
being said about the journalists by the government was unjust. As a result of civil 
society pressure through the CSOs and private radio broadcasters, the journalists 
were liberated.61  
This incident provides a clear example of the role that the media can play in 
providing information to its citizens that would otherwise never have been 
undertaken.62  
One can argue from this that to a certain degree the civil society in Burundi is able to 
influence the attitudes of people and which for the most part has the ability to 
function fairly independently from the state. To date throughout 2007 there have been 
no reports of the government using direct censorship or that it suspending operations 
by independent media (US Department of State:2007). This is a direct contrast to 
2006 where state censorship was much more visible and where attempts to 
manipulate CSOs and the media’s voice undertaken to far greater level. 
From my observations there were clear indications that the Burundian government 
still want to limit the influence of the CSO’s. Nevertheless, it is necessary to note 
here that while many journalists working within the Radio have expressed fear of 
their own security, they continue to confront the government through their work.63  
In contrast to Burundi, the government of Rwanda has over the past several years 
introduced laws and practices that severely constrain the civil society. In addition 
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there are constant harassments and intimidations of opponents, media, NGO’s and 
CSO leaders. While these types of actions from the Burundian government are also 
evident they are not conducted to the same scale. Burundians CSO’s have a large 
degree of freedom of speech and the ability to oppose the government on several 
political issues of concern (Uvin,Unsworth:2002:5). 
From this one can argue that there still exist high levels of suspicion and distrust 
exercised by the state, however, the political autonomy of the civil society 
organizations operating within Burundi can be viewed as relatively developed- 
particularly-when comparing the civil state situation to that of Rwanda.  
Throughout Part 1 I have discussed the degree of political autonomy exercised by the 
civil society actors in Bujumbura. It can be argued that the CSO’s in Bujumbura have 
gained enhanced levels of political autonomy from the state since the Peace 
Agreement of Arusha the 20th August 2000. Today civil society organizations have a 
freedom of speech and the possibility to address the state- these freedoms have not 
always been the case. Despite these positive developments64the civil society 
organizations in Bujumbura have a long way to go in order to achieve full political 
autonomy. Nevertheless, in comparison with to Rwanda where freedom of speech 
and associational activity is fully controlled by the state- one can argue that Burundi 
has advanced with regards to political autonomy from the state.  
5.4.2 Financial autonomy 
Fragility and dependence of finances 
A further dimension of organisational independence is financial autonomy. As 
emphasised in the first part of the analysis, an overall weakness characterising the 
Burundian local CSOs, is the lack of financial autonomy. All of the organisations 
except OLUCOME depend heavily on foreign donors in order to carry out their 
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objectives. In this section I will discuss how dependency on foreign donors might 
influence and affect the work and the development of local CSO’s in Burundi. 
The creation of a local CSO is one thing, however, the fully fledged functioning of a 
CSO and being able to preserve its independence is another. Most of the local 
organisations that have been created in Burundi have been founded under the 
expectation and hope that their continued existence will ultimately be financed by a 
foreign donor, either from an international NGO or other exterior funding. 
Fortunately for establishing CSOs the law of 1992 did not include any subvention or 
public financial support. 
 In general the total percentage of the total budget funding of most of Burundi’s civil 
society organizations- and all of the organizations that I personally investigated- 
deriving from domestic financial sources is minimal. In some instances domestic 
finances of CSOs comprises of less than 1%. The level of funding CSO’s receive 
from foreign donors varies.65 For the larger associations, the funding received varies 
in terms of the organisation’s objectives, its size and the type of reputation they have. 
Reputation in this sense refers to the previous work undertaken by the organisation 
and the level of result which have been accomplished in the past.  
The high dependency CSOs have on foreign financial aid renders the various CSO’s 
extremely fragile in terms of autonomy.  For the organizations investigated for the 
purpose of this thesis, dependency of foreign aid creates problem of durability. 
Several of my informants highlighted that many of the CSOs do not understand the 
importance of financial independence. Alexis Nsahimana,66 the director of COSOME 
emphasises this fact. Nsahimana recalled that on several occasions he attempted to 
discuss with the various CSO’s of the importance of creating strategies that will 
render them more financially independent. From my observations there existed very 
few organisations that had strategies and that were undertaking activities driving 
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them to become more financially independent from foreign aid. One of the exceptions 
was Radio Isanganiro.  
In the case of Burundi where poverty of the Burundian CSO’s is prevalent, the 
dependence on foreign donors in certain cases forces organisations to adjust their 
political, social and civic agendas to suit those of their benefactors. However, the 
danger involved in this is that the CSO’s could potentially loose their identity and 
instead become more of an extension of the foreign donor agencies than autonomous 
independent organisations with their own voice and objectives (Makumbe:1998:315). 
When this issue was brought up during my interviews, all of the informants 
underlined the constraints related to being dependent on foreign donors. However, 
due to the poor economic development in Burundi, they believed there was no way 
around it.  
Nsahimana, stated that the influence of the foreign donors could not be denied and 
argued that foreign donors have certain areas where they more easily give funding. 
This effectively might influence the choice of areas of work and projects of the 
various CSOs. It is important to note here that certain associations obtain funding 
more easily than others in Burundi. From my observations the organisations 
developed around subjects such as AIDS, environment, gender equality and human 
rights often received easier financial support than others. Furthermore, the 
organisations promoting the marginalized groups, such as Batwa, within the society 
in the other hand displayed a harder time searching for funding.  
According to Michael Bratton (1994:8), the over-dependence on foreign funding has 
consequences for the development of the civil society. He states that the direction of 
accountability might be reversed within the organisation, with the leaders reporting to 
donors rather than to members or clients. Another negative impact relating to the 
organisations political liability is the fact that the organisation might loose its 
credibility as advocates for the “public good” therefore causing it to loose its integrity 
among its citizens. It is clear that the issues addressed above might prove to be 
problematic for certain organisations in Burundi, however this does not seem to be 
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entirely correct in the case of Burundi civil society on a more general level. As 
previously mentioned, in 2006 when the government arrested certain private radio 
journalists it was the pressure from both the people and civil society actors which led 
to the government having to release the journalists. This is one such example that 
illustrates that the civil society has integrity and influence throughout large areas of 
the population and that that the citizens rely on them as advocates for their own good. 
As was pointed out by some of my informants, for the projects the foreign donors 
fund, the individual organisation still have the liberty to choose the strategic plan of 
the project as long as they can prove where the money has been spent. There is also a 
possibility to decline the projects they propose.67  
A further problem with foreign donors highlighted by several of my informants 
related to the fact that foreign donors rarely approve of projects that would render the 
CSO’s more economically independent. Consequently, the CSO’s will constantly be 
in a dependency relationship with the international donors. This has the potential to 
hamper the individual development of the civil society in general. The constant 
struggle for new funding obstructs the efficiency of the organisations due to so much 
of their time having to be devoted to finding potential funding rather than focusing on 
their core objectives. In addition, there is always the fear of not getting new funding 
which would lead to the reduction of the civil society. 
A further problem that follows from foreign donors is that many of the organisations 
are only funded once. Pierre-Claver Mbonimpa 68, the leader of the human rights 
organisation APRODH mentions this as a challenge to the civil society in Burundi.  
Many CSO’s in Burundi receive one financial transaction only before they get cut 
off. One of the reasons is the fact that there still exist organisations in Burundi 
working for their private interests and therefore wants to keep the money for private 
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gains. However, this is not always the case. There is also the challenge related to the 
financial capacity and the know-how of the organisations. Many organisations might 
have good objectives and strategies of how to achieve them, but they do not know 
how to organise where funding should be allocated and how it should be spent. This 
is exacerbated by the fact that much of the staff who works within Burundi’s CSO are 
not trained in budgeting and financial matters. These constraints prevents new 
organisations from developing69  
While it is evident that the dependence on foreign funding within the Burundi civil 
society has its downfalls, foreign aid is also noted to play a beneficial role within the 
Burundi civil society. The director of Radio Isanganiro mentioned one of the positive 
aspects of funding by foreign donors when he stated that foreign donations render the 
CSO’s independent of the state, thus enabling them more political autonomy.70
In this section I have emphasised the challenges of Burundian CSO’s encounter in 
relation to their dependency on foreign funding. It is clear that the foreign funding 
has the potential to influence the work of certain CSO’s. However, as a consequence 
of Burundi’s limited economical capacity it is important to recognise that in reality 
there is a lack of any substantial alternative in the near future. Despite the high degree 
of financial dependence on foreign funding it is also important to view the positive 
aspect of foreign funding. This is that foreign donors actually allow for the existence 
of CSO’s in Burundi.  Another contribution of foreign funding is the fact that it 
renders the CSO’s more politically autonomous from the state, enhancing their 
capacity to challenge the state. 
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5.5 Ethnicity 
One of the elements emphasised throughout this thesis builds on the importance of 
historical processes which has shaped the structures of power within the Burundian 
society and therefore also the civil society in Burundi. A main question addressed in 
this section is: Does ethnicity hamper the function of CSO’s in Bujumbura? 
As emphasised in the theoretical chapter, as citizenship and political identities in 
Burundi are related to ethnicity one cannot exclude the dimension of ethnicity when 
discussing the role and capacity of civil society actors in relation to the 
democratisation process in Burundi. In this section I will discuss how the political 
identities of ethnicity are explored within the urban CSO’s presented above. 
Furthermore, I intend to assess how the civil society actors address the dimension of 
ethnicity and the way in which they work to overcome the ethnic cleavages.  
In chapter 4, I highlighted that Burundi citizenship has been divided along ethnic 
lines. Ethnicity has been politicised and manipulated by the Tutsi elite for political 
gains. Kasfir argues against the exclusion of ethnic groups from civil society on 
several grounds and states that in societies where ethnic identities are strong and 
politicised, if ethnic demands are excluded from civil society it will be difficult to 
expect CSO’s to represent anything close to the full agenda of citizens 
(Wake:2004:12) Hence, it is important to address the issues of ethnicity and 
citizenship in order to understand the role civil society actors can play in a 
democratisation process.  
5.5.1 Citizenship 
One of the explanations of the extreme polarization along ethnic lines lies in the 
occurrence of violence. As mentioned in the contextual chapter, in Burundi where the 
structure of ethnic domination tended to give power and privilege to the minority 
Tutsi, political exclusion was the rule for more than 80 percent of the Hutu 
population. After independence the ethnic polarisation continued to allow the Tutsi to 
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consolidate their grip on the government as well as the military. The elections of 
1972 and 1993 ended in violence and mass-killings between the two ethnic groups, 
affecting on a larger scale the Hutu population. 
Severe acts of violence can polarise social boundaries for generations and they can 
also become absorbed in people’s sense of identity. When the social identity becomes 
associated with ethnicity it becomes part of the citizenship of each individual 
(Uvin:1999:266). 
According to Comaroff, Comaroff (1996:26), citizenship is a necessary principle of 
equivalence within the democratic nation-state. The political relevance of ethnicity is 
problematic, but as mentioned in the theoretical chapter, where ethnicity takes hold of 
the political imagination it also becomes the basis for political participation and one 
can argue that this has been the case in Burundi (Kasfir:1976:28). According to Peter 
Uvin (2006), the building of a civil society requires the creation of processes that 
allow people at all levels of society to engage in collective action; to learn to build 
their own capacities; and ultimately, to act as citizens.  
 How do the civil society actors address the question of ethnicity, and how does this 
affect the development of a well functioning civil society? Can civil society contribute 
towards creating a common civic responsibility?  
Mamdani argues that citizenship can be either ethnic or civic. Civic citizenship refers 
to membership of the central state. The qualifications for citizenship and the rights to 
which one is entitled are specified in the constitution. These rights are individual and 
located in the political and civil domain (Mamdani:2001:29)  
Ethnic citizenship on the other hand is a result of membership in the Native 
Authority. It is often related to rights of a social or economic nature where these 
rights are not accessed individually but by virtue of group membership, the group 
being the ethnic community. In relation to Burundi, one can argue that Tutsi where 
the “citizens”, with rights specified in the constitution. Accordingly the Tutsi were 
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the only group who could fully participate as members of the state. The Hutus were 
the subjects, and were thereby politically excluded.  
When talking about political exclusion, this implies the denial of political rights to 
specific ethnic or ethno- regional communities- most notably the right to vote, 
organize political parties, freely contest elections and thus become full participants in  
the political life of the country (Lemarchand:1999:5-6). The denial of full citizenship 
to one selected group is likely to fuel violent tension as have been the case in 
Burundi. Mamdani’s theoretical approach to citizenship divided between ethnic and 
civic can to a large extent explain the disproportionate level of ethnic representation 
that has affected the CSO’s in Bujumbura.  
In order to serve as a forum for the integration of different ethnic groups, it is 
important that the CSO’s in question applies- in the highest possible degree- an open 
recruitment process. As for the case of Burundi, it is necessary that the CSO’s of 
enquiry have an open recruitment in terms of ethnicity. If recruitment is excluded 
based on ethnicity and the organisation attempts to monopolize the affiliation of their 
members, then the CSOs cannot contribute to integration or conciliation. It may even 
aggravate the ethnic cleavage- creating further political turbulence. 
(Hadenius,Uggla:1996:1623).  
 In Burundi, several of my informants highlighted the problem of existing CSO’s 
created around ethnicity, with exclusive memberships. These types of CSO’s are 
hampering the development of the civil society as a whole. However, the 
organisations that I investigated in Bujumbura consisted of a mixture of the two 
ethnic groups. Nonetheless, some of my informants highlighted that this had not 
always been the case. The constraints related to the dimension of ethnicity within the 
CSO’s of enquiry were linked to when they were created in the political spectrum of 
Burundi’s history. For instance LITEKA – as mentioned previously- was created in 
1991 by members of the FRODEBU political party, when war was raging in Burundi. 
Consequently, they are associated as being a Hutu promoting party. Today the aspect 
of ethnicity is less prevalent then before as all the organisations of enquiry have 
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strategies for including both of the ethnic groups in the organisations, and openly 
discuss the problems related to ethnicity.  This coincides with my argument related to 
historical legacies and the fact that a society transforms with the shift of power 
dimensions within a society. 
My informant in RPA, drew attention to the fact that Tutsi domination has existed in 
the civil society up until recently. As highlighted with the theoretical framework of 
Mamdani, since the colonial time Tutsi have been associated with those with political 
power, while the Hutus where excluded from the political arena at least until 1993. In 
Burundi, these historical structures still persist within the society and are therefore 
reflected in the civil society structure also.71  
As the different CSO’s were created  within different periods of the Burundian 
conflict, some prior to the peace agreement of 2000 others after, this has affected 
their individual experience with the dimension of ethnicity. Several of my informants 
who represented organisations that were created during the critical years of the 
Burundian civil war 1993-1996 described their organisational development as 
constrained due to ethnicity. Specifically the women’s networks CAFOB and 
Dushirehamwe, emphasise the difficulty of getting Hutu women and Tutsi women to 
collaborate around the common goals of the organisation. Dushirehamwe was created 
by two women, one Hutu and one Tutsi. In their initial period, they put a lot of effort 
in analyzing how to overcome the ethnic tension.72 The organisation was made up of 
both Hutu and Tutsi women, however, at first the members with different ethnic 
backgrounds would not even engage with one another. As a consequence this made it 
difficult for the organisation to function around common objectives. These internal 
fractions made the civil society weak preventing it becoming a mobilising force with 
the ability to apply pressure on the state.73 However, CAFOB argues that women’s 
organisations were the first to discuss openly about the issues of ethnicity and to 
                                              
71 Interview: Emmanuel Nsabimana 
72 Interview: Christine, Miturumbwe and Scholastique Harushiyakira 
73 Interview: ibid. 
 101
emphasise the importance of fighting for common goals. Both Dushirehamwe and 
CAFOB argue that the Burundian society is sensitive to ethnicity. However, through 
the creation of these women’s organisations they have been able to bring both Hutus 
and Tutsi women to fight for common goals regarding women’s rights and female 
inclusion in political participation. Accordingly the ethnic separation today is less 
prevalent in urban Burundi than it was before.74
With regards to the private radio broadcasters, Tutsi journalists still remain 
overrepresented compared to Hutus. However, it was argued by my informants within 
the media that these power structures between the Hutus and Tutsis had improved 
over the last couple of years. The ethnic dimension between the two groups today can 
be characterised as very different compared to the period during the years of the war 
between 1994 and 1996. During the critical years, the media favoured the Tutsi, and 
in many ways excluded the Hutu. This led to ethnic tensions from time to time. The 
current director of RPA, Emmanuel Nsabimana, argues that the media works more 
professionally towards the ethnic dimension today. Representing one of the few 
Hutu’s in a leading position, he argues that the contemporary private radios include 
all the various ethnic groups. Despite this positive trend, the civil society is still 
sensitive to ethnicity.75  
As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, Dahl (1971:151-152) emphasises that the 
possibility of cooperation is weakened if the society is split into two ethnic groups- 
particularly where one is a majority and one is a minority. In addition as have been 
the case in Burundi, the minority Tutsi, has enjoyed the political power while the 
majority Hutu have been totally excluded from the political arena. Clearly this 
intensifies the distrust between the two groups. Deep distrust is a central feature or 
the Burundian society, and this distrust can be viewed at two levels; distrust exists 
between people at the local level, mainly along ethnical lines in addition to regional 
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ones76. Distrust also occurs between the people and the state. This is especially 
prevalent at the regional level, which will be addressed in the next chapter. 
Due to the historical legacy of war and massacres, many have argued that the 
Burundians in general have learned through history to become inherently 
“distrusting”. Emmanuel Nsabimana provides an example of the level of distrust 
within the Burundian society, stating that “people don’t trust each other in general”. 
Nsabimana highlights that in the urban areas of Burundi civilians are more open than 
those located in the rural areas. Burundi has been and still is- though to a lesser 
extent- a society built upon rumours. Rumours have in the past had a tendency to 
have a negative influence on the ethnic tension between Hutu and Tutsi. 
Several of my informants emphasised that ethnicity and trust obstruct the 
development of the civil society in Burundi.77 Many of the civil society leaders 
encounter difficulties due to the fact that their political pressure is interpreted as 
either Hutu or Tutsi oriented. For example, when a Hutu from one branch of the civil 
society want to pursue a political case that he sees as wrong against a Tutsi, at times 
his action is not considered as an attempt to promote for positive change, but rather it 
is seen as having an ethnic undertone. Consequently it becomes difficult for CSO’s to 
promote change.  
The strategy applied to the CSO’s in Bujumbura has attempted to unite both Tutsi 
and Hutu in the organisations to the greatest level possible. Consequently, the 
Bujumbura CSO’s have experienced less negative reactions related to ethnical 
belonging over recent years. As a result, trust and cooperation is improving. 
However, it is still fragile and there is a need for stabilisation within the country in 
order to develop these positive trends. 
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As I have highlighted in this section, the CSO’s in Burundi during the 1990s were 
clearly obstructed as a consequence of ethnic cleavages and divides. The 
organisations suffered from severe problems in organising themselves around 
common interests and preferences. One can argue that the CSO’s are influenced by 
the political processes within the society. Since the peace agreement of Arusha, one 
can argue that the ethnic divide is less prevalent in urban areas as all the CSO’s of 
enquiry in Bujumbura represented both Hutus and Tutsis. Nevertheless, the 
Burundian society is still sensible to ethnicity. The impact of this is still visible within 
the Burundian society as will be presented in the section below.  
5.5.2 Ethnic tension 
Education and Ethnicity 
 
The monopoly of political power in Burundi held by the particular Tutsi group over 
the last 40 years, has been imbued at almost every level of society. This has also been 
the case within the Burundi education system. From primary to the tertiary level, 
ethnic tensions are present (Bentley and Southall:2005:179) and there still exists a 
distinct disproportion of educated people between Hutus and Tutsis within modern 
day Burundi. The Tutsi still represents the intellectual elite.  
Since the nation’s independence successive military regimes have sought to exclude 
the Hutu from education, especially above high school level. State services kept 
records that identified children as either Hutu or Tutsi. These have been used to 
exclude Hutus from enrolling into high school and college. As mentioned in the 
contextual chapter the divide between the Hutu and Tutsi population was intensified 
by the 1972 mass- killings. The Tutsi benefited from the colonial system while the 
Hutu’s suffered a general loss of political, social and economic power. Consequently, 
the marginalisation of Hutus led to few Hutu’s ever gaining access to higher 
education in Burundi, and many of those who actually did were killed in 1972. 
(Bentley and Southall:2005:179).   
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The implication of the intentional exclusion of Hutus in regards to their 
marginalisation within the education system is visible within contemporary Burundi 
society which has subsequently affected the general structure of the local civil 
society. This is because education and expertise are essential requirements of a well 
functioning civil society. Education and expertise are vital elements of being able to 
effectively an efficiently run organisations that have sufficient capacity required to 
influence the state.  
The domination of Tutsis within the intellectual elite has also led to a domination of 
Tutsis within the civil society. The director of Radio Publique Africaine-a member of 
the Hutu group-highlights the ethnic divide within the civil society and emphasises 
that up until four years ago the civil society was largely dominated by Tutsis. The 
explanation for this clear ethnic divide is highly related to education and the fact that 
Tutsis continue to represent the majority within the intellectual elite.78  
Even though there was a representative mix of the ethnic groups within the CSO’s, 
due to the educated elite being Tutsi, they continue to hold the leadership positions.  
The inclusion of Hutus within civil society has posed some difficulties. This is 
because, some of the Hutus who become integrated into an organisation require 
intensive levels of training in order to adequately perform their roles and the 
responsibilities associated with the job they have been hired to undertake.  
For example within the radio, a Hutu entering an organisation with no formal 
education will be inferior to a Tutsi who already has the prerequisite educational 
background required to perform journalistic research. Even though the Hutu 
population are able to be taught how to perform various tasks and roles, Nsabimana 
highlights that there is a danger of ‘ethnic tension’. While this was not underlined 
specifically by my informants, it was clear that the lack of education of the Hutu 
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population poses constraints in their ability to obtain ethnic equivalence within the 
civil society in the near future.79  
Education -or rather the lack of education -is a severe problem for the development of 
the country as a whole. This is because it is almost always the intellectual who 
manipulate the non-educated.80 The majority of the non educated are located in the 
rural parts of Burundi and it is usually the rurally based population who frequently 
engage in conflict and who kill each. Therefore education is a crucial weakness both 
for the development of the Burundian society as a whole but also in relation to 
political autonomy. This is because if the population is educated the government and 
its allegiances are less able to easily manipulate the population.81 During my 
fieldwork, I observed severe differences between the urban and the rural civil society. 
Hence, I believe it is of high importance to highlight the urban- rural dimension in 
relation to the civil society in Burundi. The differences I experienced in the rural area 
of Butaganzwa regarding elements of ethnicity, autonomy and patron-client 
relationship will be presented in a separate chapter below. 
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6. Rural civil society- case of Butuganzwa 
The urban- rural dimension is important when discussing the civil society aspect in 
Burundi. As Kasfir points out, it is not possible to argue that ends of democracy are 
furthered if one excludes the issues and organisations that represents the majority of 
the population (Wake:2004:14). It is impossible to isolate the political development 
of civil society in Burundi from the regional political context (Reyntjens:2001:21).As 
the majority of the Burundian population-90 percent82- are situated in the rural areas, 
one needs to consider the development in these more isolated regions in order to be 
able to accurately comment on the civil society as a democratic contributor. 
Mamdani (1996) - who sees little movement toward democratisation despite recent 
political change in Africa- argues that only when the rural inhabitants are organised 
as true citizens will democracy be possible in Africa. This insight partly explains the 
findings I made in accordance to the development of civil society in Burundi. 
This section will explore the dimension of civil society actors in the rural areas of 
Butaganzwa north of Burundi, who are referred to in this context as “communitarian 
associations”. My argument is that civil society actors have been shaped politically, 
by the colonial imposition of a certain form of rule, and that these identities still 
persist in Burundi today. Consequently, the rural areas are more ethnically based than 
those CSO’s in the urban areas of Bujumbura.  
6.1 Organisations represented in Butaganzwa 
During my field work in Butaganzwa I was able to secure a group of representatives 
from most of the communitarian associations in the municipality in order to carry out 
a workshop in regards to this issue. The communitarian associations presented below 
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is therefore the total picture of existing “communitarian associations” in the 
municipality. 
More than 300 communitarian associations in Butaganzwa represented various 
domains of agriculture. The main objectives of these agricultural associations were 
linked to the cultivation of crops or animals. Some of those who possessed goats or 
cows had created “solidarity networks”, meaning that they shared their animals with 
the members of the association. The little money they earned from their crops was 
divided between the members of the associations. Within these agricultural 
associations their objectives are linked to development of the agricultural sector. The 
main challenges encountered by this group of people, is concerned with access to 
resources, modern equipment and expertise in addition to the lack of connection to 
foreign export markets for coffee and tea. Many of these 300 agricultural 
encompassed highly similar objectives. However, despite sharing common goals and 
objectives there appeared to be no collaboration between any of the organisations. 
Neither did there exist any collaboration with any of the agricultural CSO’s situated 
in Bujumbura.  
In addition to the associations representing various domains within the agricultural 
sector, other associations represented operated within the domains of water and 
hydraulic management, Artisans, Youth and Sport Associations, humanitarians 
Associations and the minority Batwa. 
The main objective of water and hydraulic management associations was to provide 
the population of Butaganzwa with clean water. As a consequence of war, several of 
the water resources have been destroyed. In addition, many people do not have basic 
knowledge of hygiene in order to maintain the standard of the water. The work of 
these associations is to provide people with the necessary knowledge of how to 
maintain the water pumps in order to prevent people from contracting diseases due to 
infected water. 
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Youth organisations were represented by young people in the municipality. Their 
main objective was to organise activities for the younger population in terms of sport 
and culture. The purpose of this was to prevent the violence which has been a 
problem in the region. 
Batwa association was mainly comprised by the Batwa women and youth. Their 
main objective was related to gaining money necessary to survive. By tilling the soil 
of others or making pottery to sell on the market they could provide the associations 
with some resources to survive. The aim of the Batwa population is to be recognized 
as equals in relation to the other groups in the municipality so they are working 
overcome the ignorance against them.  
The community based associations observed in Butaganzwa proved to be clearly 
different from those found in the urban area of Bujumbura. In the rural areas of 
Burundi, the majority of community based organisations that exist today were 
established after the political crisis of 1996 as Butaganzwa was one of the areas most 
affected by the war. They represented mainly informal self help groups and peasant 
organisations. Each of these organisations shared similarities in their lack of 
availability to resources and capacity. There existed a visible internal hierarchical 
patron-client relationship throughout several of the organisations and in relation to 
the local government.  
 The main characteristic shared by the majority of these associations was that the 
organisations represent developmental objectives rather than objectives serving any 
clear democratic purpose. The objectives are mainly related to the development of the 
agricultural sector. My observation was that most of these communitarian 
associations were either based on familial ties, kinship or ethnicity. Only a small 
percentage of the population had access to any education above primary school level 
which evidently inhibited the population from developing the required expertise 
needed in order to create an organisation.  
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Patron client relationship networks usually exist within ethnic groups. Most of the 
associations represented above were based on ethnicity and there were evident signs 
of patron-client relationships on various levels between the local administration and 
the civil society and also within the CSO’s. Several of the members representing the 
organisations highlighted their dissatisfaction with the local administration. Part of 
this discontent was the result of the local administration’s constant collection of 
money from these organisations.  
In Burundi where a decentralisation process has taken place, such a process can 
enforce the patron client relationships that already exist within the society. If local 
traditional patrons control the state apparatus at its lower levels, they may actually 
pose a severe impediment to popular participation (Hadenius, Uggla:1996:1621) In 
the case of Butaganzwa this appears to have been the case- primarily due to the fact 
that the poverty and the lack of education are severe in this region. As a result the 
population is more susceptible to being easily manipulated by the local government.  
The majority of these associations had gained official approval by the local 
administration, however gaining approval from the local government has not always 
translated to enjoying a role of freedom from it. For example local administration 
actively engaged in evident signs of surveillance. There was also a total 
misinterpretation from the local government of what role the communitarian 
associations should play in the region. The notion of “civil society” was intended to 
enhance the development of the municipality, however it was clear from the local 
administration that they were not allowed to interfere in the politics conducted in the 
municipality. Accordingly, there was a clear absence of political autonomy amongst 
these associations.  
As presented in the first part of this analysis, out of the CSO’s in Bujumbura, a 
number of these had antennas and offices in the rural part of the country. However, in 
general this was more of an exception than the rule. This characterizes a weakness of 
the civil society in Burundi. This is because almost none of the organisations make 
attempts to actively collaborate with the smaller associations throughout the interior 
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regions of the country. When the majority of the population live in rural areas this 
clearly displays a weakness as CSOs are failing to represent the general view of the 
majority of the population. This raises the question of whether the rural population 
have any significant say in the decisions made on behalf of the “nation” as a whole. 
In terms of financial funding, the rural associations they live in the hope of getting 
funded by development agencies. The extreme poverty and the lack of resources that 
exists in most of the rural areas, including Butaganzwa hamper the mobilisation of a 
viable organisation capable of creating objectives that can realistically reduce 
poverty. For example the associations that are able to gain funding from their 
agricultural production have to then pay the local administration, which hampers their 
ability to develop. 
As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, Mamdani criticise the neglect of rural 
conditions and the institutional particularities of urban and rural state form in Africa. 
His approach towards politicisation, collective identities and democratisation is 
rooted in colonialism and their institutionalisation of what he refers to as the 
“bifurcated state” (Mamdani:1996:16-23). Mamdani argues that the “civil society” 
organisations aimed at authoritarian regimes in Africa have been heavily based in the 
urban middle class which underlines my findings in Burundi. In order to understand 
the civil society in contemporary rural Burundi, one needs to emphasise this rural- 
urban divide particular for the African state. 
Mamdani’s theoretical framework (1996) helps to explain the differences in my 
findings between the civil society actors in Bujumbura and Butaganzwa. In his theory 
regarding the “bifurcated state” he argues that the civil society became bifurcated as 
well, represented as civilised in the urban areas while tribalized in rural areas. 
 This serves as a critique to the theory of Chabal Daloz of the political 
instrumentalization of disorder-mentioned in the theoretical chapter. Chabal and 
Daloz reject the notion that colonialism was decisive in shaping these societies in this 
direction: “the time has long passed when we, Westerners, had to expiate the colonial 
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crime of our forefathers” (Chabal Daloz: 1999:xviii)  Instead, Chabal and 
Daloz(1999:11) argue that the essential feature which should be emphasised is “the 
significance of continuities in political practice from the pre to the post-colonial 
period”. My main argument related to the above is that a society is not static but it is 
constantly affected by the changing structural processes of history. Consequently the 
colonialism has affected the modern day divide between the rural and urban civil 
society in Burundi. 
This analysis has emphasised that there exists a distinctive difference between the 
urban and the rural CSO’s in Burundi in terms of capacity, autonomy, ethnicity and 
patron-client relationship.  
The question that now needs to be addressed is in which way such a divided civil 
society can contribute in the democratisation process. This will be presented in the 
section below. 
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7. Civil society and democratisation in Burundi 
Summing up chapter 5 and 6  
 
The relationship between civil society and the democratisation process is a 
complicated one. The emergence of a civil society is not a guarantee for democracy, 
however it is unlikely that a viable democracy can function without a viable civil 
society (Woods:1992:94). It is within the civil society that public opinions take form 
and it is through CSO’s that individuals are able to influence government decision 
making. 
As viewed in chapter 5, Burundi has only experienced one decade in which to set 
about developing its own civil society. Therefore it would be largely inappropriate to 
expect the civil society of Burundi to function to the same levels as it does in most 
developing countries. 
Nevertheless, from the analysis undertaken above it can be argued that the CSO’s in 
Bujumbura are necessary contributors to the Burundian society in various ways. 
Today, there exist various categories of CSOs in Bujumbura which contribute 
towards the advancement of democracy in various ways and in different degrees. 
7.1 Main findings 
The human rights organisations- LITEKA, ABDP and APRODH- existing for more 
than a decade are viewed by the rest of the civil society as the most influential of the 
CSO’s. With over ten years of operational experience in Burundi, these organisations 
have had the time to strengthen their political influence. This has facilitated these 
organisations achieving their goals and objectives more efficiently than other CSOs 
operating in Bujumbura. The role of the above mentioned organisations can be 
characterised as “protectors of life” in the sense that they are able to directly assist 
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victims of human rights violations in addition to actively lobbying the government on 
human rights issues of concern. Their achievements in protecting life provide 
favourable conditions necessary for the democratisation process to transpire.  
The female networks of CAFOB and Dushirehamwe play an important role within 
the urban civil society network in Burundi. Their role is to create awareness among 
women regarding their rights and responsibilities. In addition they train women to 
participate in politics and furthermore enhance their socio- political capacity. 
Promoting the democratic and political awareness among the population clearly 
creates favourable conditions for enhanced democracy. Furthermore, these network 
organisations have lobbied the government in order to advance the involvement of 
women in the political arena. Such an initiative is a contribution towards improved 
gender equality within the Burundian society. 
Representing governmental surveillance and the fight against corruption, the specific 
organisations OAG, COSOME and OLUCOME hold the capacity to contribute in the 
democratisation process more directly and effectively than most of the CSO’s in 
Burundi. This due to the fact that they actively challenge the state on political issues 
of concern. Each of these organisations provides a small yet important contribution 
towards further transparency of governmental policies. The OAG together with 
COSOME holds an important educative role with regards to promoting democratic 
values among different pockets of the population. As outlined in this thesis, the 
example of OLUCOME has proven that it is possible for the CSO’s to make a 
contribution towards the battle against corruption. 
A further important aspect of development within the civil society of Bujumbura is 
the emergence of the private radio stations, particularly those independent from the 
state- RPA and Radio Isanganiro. Despite several attempts from the government to 
censor the work of these radio broadcasters, this form of media has the capacity to 
render the work of the CSO’s more visible both for the citizens and for the state. This 
has clearly strengthens the visibility of the work of CSO’s in addition to enhancing 
influence vis a vis the state. The above mentioned radio stations have even 
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ameliorated the cooperation between the civil society and the state by means of 
Burundian politicians often choosing to make guest appearances on radio broadcasts 
in order to actively talk about political issues of concern. 
Despite these positive developments there are several constraints which hinder the 
influence of the CSO’s. Political censorship still exists to varying degrees and the 
government continues to make attempts to influence the work of the civil society. 
Even now the government still views civil society as an opposition rather than as a 
positive contributor to the state. In addition, all the CSO’s in Bujumbura are 
dependent on foreign funding which hampers their efficiency. This is because instead 
of being able to focus solely on their objectives they find themselves on a constant 
search for new funding so that they are able to continue to operate. 
As also emphasised in chapter 5 and 6 civil society in Burundi is still affected by the 
ethnic division of Hutu and Tutsi although most of the organisations in the urban 
areas have implemented strategies to overcome this problem. This ongoing ethnic 
division has subsequently stalled the speed at which Burundi’s democratisation 
process has transpired. 
The CSO’s in Bujumbura have however proved that they are on their way to 
overcome the ethnic cleavage. Though ethnicity still persists within the Burundian 
society, hindering to a certain degree the cooperation between the CSO’s, there has 
been a clear improvement compared to a few years ago. Within the civil society the 
ethnic representation of the various ethnicities employed within the civil society is 
becoming increasingly proportionate. Today there are several Hutus in leading 
positions within the civil society which was not the case prior to the election of 2005. 
From these finding it can be argued to a certain extent that the CSO’s in Bujumbura 
play a consolatory role with regards to the ethnic cleavage. Nevertheless, as the Tutsi 
population still represents the majority of the intellectual elite in Bujumbura, the civil 
society still remains elite led in certain ways. 
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As Ekhe (1975) explains, due to the colonial experience in Africa, many African 
countries seem to have two publics, one “civil” and one “primordial”. This can be 
said to be the case of Burundi, where the CSO’s represent both “civil” and 
democratic functions but also structures of patron–client relationships from the past. 
This dimension is especially visible with regard to the rural- urban divide. While the 
communitarian associations in the rural area of Butaganzwa lack the capacity, 
structure and expertise required to influence the local government and to contribute to 
political change, the CSO’s investigated in the urban area of Bujumbura hold the 
capacity and resources necessary to a certain extent to influence the enhancement of 
democracy. 
In contrast to the CSO’s in Bujumbura, the communitarian association in Butaganzwa 
were closely tied up to ethnicity and kinship which appears to have hindered their 
democratic potential. In addition, the few communitarian associations that exist in 
Butaganzwa were mainly focused on developmental issues such as agriculture rather 
than concentrating on democratic objectives. Furthermore, the cooperation and 
synergies between these associations appeared to be almost non existent. Accordingly 
this has led to a lack of mobilisation and strength between the communitarian 
associations-vital elements in promoting and enhancing the democratisation process. 
From the findings presented above, the CSO’s hold different roles within the 
Burundian society and there exists clear differentiation between the urban civil 
society and the rural civil society. Due to 90 percent of the population in Burundi 
living in rural areas, the overall weakness of the associations observed in Butaganzwa 
clearly hampers the civil society of Burundi on the whole. This is because the 
majority of the citizens are excluded from the civil society activities as they tend to 
take place mainly in Bujumbura. Even though some of the CSO’s in Bujumbura had 
offices in the rural areas this was more of an exception than the rule. There existed no 
cooperation between the CSO’s in Bujumbura and the communitarian associations of 
Butaganzwa.  
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Despite the weaknesses mentioned above, the civil society in Burundi has an 
important role within the Burundian society. In many ways they have taken the role 
that the state holds in Western countries. While their degree of influence is hard to 
measure, parts of the civil society hold the ability to influence the state. Furthermore, 
while civil society in Burundi will not necessarily produce democracy, it is essential 
as an arena in which contending political norms develop and evolve. This may 
provide a breeding ground for democracy in a long term perspective. 
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8. Conclusion 
8.1 Future research 
My point of departure for investigating the relationship between civil society and 
democratisation in Burundi was the fact that no prior research has been done on the 
area. The relationship between civil society and democratisation has gained more 
attention over the last decade, however there is still a lack of micro studies and 
knowledge regarding civil society in Africa existing today. Despite important 
contributions regarding these issues from important Africanist scholars such as 
Mamdani and Kasfir, the debate is still largely tied up to the neo-liberal literature. 
This view looks upon civil society as inherently democratic and fails to take into 
consideration the fact that a civil society may differ in its role and function depending 
on the context. As for Africa, the societal structures clearly differ from those in the 
more developed countries. This thesis has filled parts of the knowledge gap regarding 
the interplay of civil society and the democratisation process in the context of 
Burundi. Nevertheless, a single case study conducted over a limited period of time 
has its limits. Therefore there is a need to conduct further research on the area.   
In Burundi as in most countries where civil war has raged for years, the main victims 
are often women. In Burundi, women comprise the majority of the population. For 
this reason, they play an important role in the transition process towards 
democratisation. As mentioned earlier the illiteracy levels in Burundi among women 
are higher than those of the men. Consequently, women are provided with fewer 
opportunities to participate in politics. Equality of opportunity for women is still a 
distant goal in Burundi and in order to create a democratic state where women have 
the possibility to express their points of views to the same extent as men, more 
research on women’s network organisations in Burundi and how to increase and 
enforce their capacity is needed.  
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Providing a means of comparison to other African nations, as illustrated in the 
analysis, Burundians and the civil society holds a higher degree of freedom of speech 
compared to other countries in the Great Lakes Region. The issues related to ethnicity 
and the crisis between the two dominant groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis are able to 
be openly discussed in the policies arena. Consequently, there now appears to be an 
enhanced effort to discuss the ethnic problems in order to overcome these. This is for 
instance not the case in Rwanda where there exists no freedom of speech or any 
ability to discuss the issues related to ethnicity. As the freedom of speech is severely 
limited in Rwanda the development of a vital civil society will be significantly 
hampered. As Rwanda and Burundi in many ways share a similar history of 
colonisation and are comprised of the same ethnic groups, and interesting study 
would be to compare the civil society in these two countries and to establish potential 
reasoning’s to why these two countries have significantly divergent approaches 
towards CSO’s and the democratisation process.   
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 List of people interviewed 
Organisation Name Position Date 
OAG                         Melchior, 
Dayishimiye 
Executive Secretary 29.01.08 
COSOME Alexis, Nsahimana Administrator of 
Programs 
24.01.08 
FORSC Gordien, Baranyanka Communication 
Responsible 
23.01.08 
OLUCOME Gabriel, Rufyiri Chairman of the 
Organisation 
31.01.08 
Ligue ITEKA Dr. Chantal, 
Niyokindi 
Executive Secretary 29.01.08 
Dushirehamwe Christine, 
Miturumbwe and 
Scholastique 
Harushiyakira 
Founders and 
Directresses  
08.02.08 
CAFOB Concilie, Gahunger Directress   28.01.08 
Biraturaba Emmanuel 
Nshimirimana 
Founder and Director 08.02.08 
ABDP Laurent Gahungu
  
Director 23.01.08 
APRODH   Pierre Claver 
Mbonimpa 
 Founder and 
Director 
25.01.08 
Radio Isanganiro Mathias Manirakiza Director 31.01.08 
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Radio Publique 
Africain 
Emmanuel 
Nsabimana 
Director 07.02.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
